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INTRODUCTION 
 David Buttars challenges his convictions for securities fraud and 
engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity based on his fraudulent 
misstatements and omissions to investors, and his other fraudulent business 
practices, including lying to investors about how investment funds would be 
spent and about his prior failed efforts to develop and market the same 
technology.  
 First, Buttars claims that the bank records used to show misuse of 
investor funds should have been suppressed. This argument fails because the 
records were obtained through a valid subpoena lawfully issued by a district 
court under the Subpoena Powers Act.  
-2- 
 Second, he argues the bank records were inadmissible hearsay. The 
majority of the records were admissible under the business records exception. 
Those that were not were admissible under the residual exception because 
they had equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 
 Third, Buttars claims his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
summaries of bank records, for proposing a jury instruction defining 
willfully, and for not objecting to statements made during trial about 
“material omissions” in the securities fraud context. Buttars has not proven 
deficient performance or prejudice. Competent counsel could have 
reasonably viewed the summaries, the jury instruction, and the statements as 
consistent with Utah law, or that any errors were so minor as to not merit 
consideration. And any error was so insignificant that counsel’s performance, 
if deficient, was not reasonably likely to have changed the outcome in light 
of the totality of the evidence. 
 Fourth, he argues that some expert testimony was inadmissible. The 
expert testimony was proper because it was similar to that approved of in 
other cases and because the opinions offered were not tied to Utah law. In 
addition, any error was not prejudicial. 
 Finally, Buttars cumulative error claim fails because there were no 
errors to accumulate. 
-3- 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Did the trial court properly deny the motion to suppress the bank 
records obtained by a subpoena lawfully issued under the Subpoena Powers 
Act? 
 Standard of Review. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The underlying factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error while legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, including the application of the law to the facts. State v. Fuller, 
2014 UT 29, ¶17, 332 P.3d 937. 
 2. Did the trial court properly rule that the bank records were 
admissible hearsay? 
 Standard of Review. When reviewing hearsay rulings, legal questions are 
reviewed “for correctness, factual questions for clear error, and the final 
ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion.” State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 
134, ¶14, 302 P.3d 844. 
 3. Has Buttars proven both elements of his claim that counsel was 
ineffective because he (1) did not object to the admission of the summaries of 
bank records under rule 1006, Utah Rules of Evidence; (2) proposed an 
allegedly erroneous definition of “willfully;” and (3) did not object to 
-4- 
statements made by an expert, the prosecutor, and the jury instructions about 
making material omissions in the securities fraud context? 
 Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for 
the first time on appeal present questions of law. State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶16, 
247 P.3d 344. 
 4. Has Buttars shown an abuse of discretion by the trial court’s 
admission of expert testimony that offered no opinion about whether Buttars 
violated Utah law? 
 Standard of Review. A trial court’s “wide discretion in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony” is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
 5. Has Buttars established cumulative error? 
 Standard of Review. Under the cumulative error doctrine, this Court 
applies the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim of error 
and reverses only if the cumulative effect of several errors undermines 
confidence in a fair trial. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶16. 
 
 
-5- 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts. 
Ellipse Technology and MovieBlitz 
 Defendant David Buttars joined Vince Romney in a start-up company 
called Ellipse Technology. R4855–56,4860. The purpose of Ellipse was to 
create a product for renting digital movies from a kiosk by downloading 
them onto a “modified flash drive” or “key” that could be taken home for 
viewing. R4856,5025; State’sTr.Ex.1 & 2. 
 Buttars was an engineer and had worked with Romney previously on 
another start-up. R4854–55. Romney recruited Buttars to develop the 
technology for the kiosk and “key.” R4855–56,4910. Buttars and Romney ran 
Ellipse “50/50,” with Buttars as CEO and Romney as president and CIO. 
R4859,4895,4910,4940,4954. Others were brought in to assist with software 
research and development, R4908–09,4939, fundraising, R4910–11,4954,5027–
28, or other corporate duties, R4860–61. For about two years, Buttars and 
Romney received a salary from Ellipse that came from individual investor 
funds. R4863,4865. 
 Buttars’ main responsibilities were overseeing financing and 
fundraising, establishing relationships with investors, and managing bank 
accounts, as well as developing the technology. R4859–60,4910,5027–28,5033. 
-6- 
But really, as CEO, “[h]e was over everything.” R4954. Buttars “made [it] very 
clear from the start” that he “was in charge,” and the others viewed him as 
“the top decision maker.” R5028–29. 
 After Ellipse had raised between $600,000 and $750,000, Ellipse’s 
attorneys told the company to stop raising money from individual investors 
and to instead seek out large institutional investors. R4864–65,4931,5039. But 
when a large institutional investor made an offer in the millions of dollars for 
a large ownership stake in Ellipse, Buttars exercised his authority and turned 
it down even though the others, including Romney, wanted to accept it. 
R4865–66,4920–21. 
 Buttars later brought his friend Mark LaCount into Ellipse as a board 
member and executive because LaCount “claimed to have access to large 
amounts of institutional funding overseas.” R4868–69,4923–24,4940,5030. 
That funding never materialized. R4869–70.  
 With the lack of institutional investors, Ellipse was “running out of 
funds.” R4870,4929–30,4935. Romney and the others learned that Buttars was 
misusing Ellipse’s funds to pay for LaCount’s mortgage, among other things, 
R4871,4924–30, and that Buttars was soliciting individual investors again, 
against the advice of counsel. R4870–71.  
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 Romney and the other original members filed a lawsuit against Buttars 
“to get control of the company.” R4935–36. Buttars resigned as CEO but 
refused to relinquish control of Ellipse—he retained his shares and his voting 
rights—claiming that it was “his technology” and that Ellipse could not go 
forward without him. R5070. A dispute about ownership of the patents 
between Buttars and Romney also arose, encumbering the patents. R4901–02. 
“Ellipse ultimately just dissolved” sometime in 2009. R4877–78. On May 1, 
2009, Ellipse’s bank account was closed after the last $145.47 was transferred 
to Buttars’ personal account. State’sTr.Ex.26 at 7. 
 As Ellipse dissolved, Buttars and LaCount formed “MovieBlitz” to 
continue raising money from investors to develop the same technology. 
R4965,5090–91; State’sTr.Ex.8 & 37. Between the two companies, Buttars 
raised over $815,000 from investors between January 2007 and April 2010. 
R5209; State’sTr.Ex.32. 
Material Misstatements to Investors and Use of Funds 
 One of Buttars’ key roles in both Ellipse and MovieBlitz was to speak 
with potential investors. R4859–60. Through those efforts, Rebecca Gerritsen 
invested $15,000 in Ellipse—$10,000 initially and $5,000 two years later, 
R5074–76, State’sTr.Ex.3. And he secured investments for MovieBlitz from 
Janet Hinman ($2,000), R5090–92, State’sTr.Ex.5–6; Orjan Gustafsson ($9,000 
-8- 
in two separate payments), R5118–23,5126–27, State’sTr.Ex.9–12; and Gary 
Miller ($10,000), R5148–51, State’sTr.Ex.16–19. Each of these investments 
were made after Buttars made material misstatements and omissions, 
including about how their investment funds would be used. 
 Gerritsen made her second investment in March 2009, during the 
period that Ellipse was facing financial difficulties. R5075–76; see R4868–70, 
4929–30. Buttars told her that he “needed just a little bit more money,” and 
that the payment “would be used for the technology” and “to get it to market 
more quickly.” R5075–78. Buttars did not tell her that the funds could be used 
for any other purpose. R5078–79. Within six weeks, Gerritsen’s $5,000 
investment, along with another investor’s $10,000 investment, was gone. 
State’sTr.Ex.27; R5188–91. Over $9,000 went to Buttars’ ex-wife, purportedly 
for legal fees incurred several months earlier for patent work. State’sTr.Ex.27; 
Def’sTr.Ex.24. Over $3,000 was paid to a private investigator, for which 
Ellipse had no need. State’sTr.Ex.27; R4867–77. The majority of the remaining 
funds were spent on personal expenses, such as groceries, gas, phone and 
satellite tv bills, insurance, and housecleaning, including over $1,700 that was 
transferred to Buttars’ personal account before it was spent. State’sTr.Ex.27; 
R4917–18,5456–57. 
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 Two months later, Hinman and Gustafsson invested in MovieBlitz 
after Buttars told them about the technology—with pictures and diagrams of 
the key and kiosk—and about the patents he had obtained. R5090–91,5118–
19; State’sTr.Ex.8. He presented the idea in “fabulous terms,” with a 
“positive” tone that made it seem “too good to be true.” R5096–97,5119,5125. 
Buttars, however, did not tell them that Ellipse attempted to market this same 
product but failed. R5111,5120. Hinman and Gustafsson were told that their 
investment funds would be used to produce the key and kiosk and to 
incorporate in Nevada. R5098,5133. No other uses for the funds, including for 
personal expenses, were discussed. R5098–99,5113,5133–34.  
 The first $1,500 of Hinman’s investment was deposited into a brand 
new MovieBlitz account. State’sTr.Ex.31. Five-hundred dollars was 
transferred to LaCount’s personal account, $400 was withdrawn in cash, and 
$215 was transferred to Buttars’ personal account where it was commingled 
with his personal funds. State’sTr.Ex.31. The remaining $500 from Hinman, 
along with the first $2,000 from Gustafsson, were deposited directly into 
Buttars’ personal account. State’sTr.Ex.29. While $859 was spent on “Incorp 
Services,” possibly to incorporate MovieBlitz in Nevada, the remaining funds 
were spent on groceries, gas, restaurants, clothing, a talent agency, and other 
-10- 
personal expenses. State’sTr.Ex.29 & 31. In less than a month, Hinman’s and 
Gustafsson’s combined $4,000 was gone. Id.; R5191–97,5201–04. 
 Gustafsson later invested an additional $7,000 that was deposited into 
the MovieBlitz account. R5125–26; State’sTr.Ex.30. Over the next three weeks, 
$200 was withdrawn, $800 was spent at Fresh Market grocery store, and 
$5,500 was transferred to Buttars’ personal account, where the money was 
spent on a variety of expenses unrelated to producing the product as 
Gustafsson was told it would be: $2,200 to pay another investor, $2,100 for a 
debt settlement, $334 for child support payments, a $300 withdrawal, and 
hundreds of dollars on utilities, groceries, gas, clothing, and restaurants, as 
well as multiple bank charges for insufficient funds. State’sTr.Ex.30; R5197–
5201. Just three weeks after Gustafsson’s $7,000 investment, MovieBlitz’s 
account balance was $293.80 and Buttars’ personal account balance was 
negative $1,628.04. State’sTr.Ex.30; R5198–99. 
 Finally, Buttars spoke with Miller in January 2010 about MovieBlitz. 
R5148–49. Like the others, Miller was told about the company’s product and 
that his investment would only be used “to develop the key and the kiosks.” 
R5149,5155. And like the others, Buttars did not tell Miller about Ellipse or 
about MovieBlitz’s financial difficulties. R5149,5154–55,5162. Buttars also did 
not explain that the patents were encumbered. R5155. 
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 Miller invested $10,000, which was deposited into MovieBlitz’s 
account. State’sTr.Ex.28. Over the next month, $3,000 was transferred to 
LaCount and $5,900 was transferred to Buttars’ personal account. 
State’sTr.Ex.28. Buttars’ personal account began with a balance of negative 
$1,742.79 (after having spent all of Gustafsson’s investment on personal 
expenses), and the only funds added were Miller’s funds from the MovieBlitz 
account. State’sTr.Ex.28 & 30. The funds were used for debt settlement 
($2,100), groceries, gas, bail bonds, child support, restaurants, iTunes music, 
etc., and ended with a balance of $107.38 after one month. State’sTr.Ex.28. 
 Each of these investors supplied funding at a time when the Ellipse or 
MovieBlitz accounts were at or close to zero, and the funds from each  was 
spent within weeks, bringing the balances close to zero once again. See 
State’sTr.Ex.26–31. But none of the investors were told that the companies 
were undercapitalized. R5113,5134,5228. Miller received a payment of $6,500 
a few months after he invested, but these investors saw no other returns. 
R5079,5102,5133,5152; State’sTr.Ex.26 at 12. 
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
 Buttars was charged with four counts of securities fraud and four 
counts of theft—one of each for each of the four investors discussed above—
and one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity. R534–39. 
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Subpoenas for Bank Records 
 Before filing the Information, the State obtained three investigative 
subpoenas for bank records for the accounts of Buttars, Ellipse, MovieBlitz, 
and LaCount from Frontier Bank (“Frontier”) and JP Morgan Chase Bank 
(“Chase”). R2945,2949; see R797–99,818–20,834–36 (Addendum B). For each 
subpoena, Agent Nesbitt prepared a good cause statement that he emailed to 
a paralegal at the Salt Lake County District Attorney’s Office, and the 
paralegal prepared the subpoenas. R2943. Agent Nesbit prepared no 
paperwork other than the good cause statement. R2944. Agent Nesbitt picked 
up the subpoenas, took them to the court where they were signed by a 
magistrate, and served them on the banks. R2943–44,2947.  
 The first Frontier subpoena sought “all account records” for Ellipse and 
Buttars from January 1, 2007 to April 1, 2011. R797–99. The records were 
produced in two distributions, each with its own custodial certification. 
R803–04,2947–48. Agent Nesbit later subpoenaed Frontier for “all account 
records” for MovieBlitz and LaCount from June 1, 2008 to December 31, 2010. 
R834–36. These records were produced via a secure email. R2947–48,2993; see 
Def.’sEvid.Hr’gEx.P. However, this batch was not produced with a custodial 
certificate. See R1153,5503. 
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 Agent Nesbitt also subpoenaed records from Chase seeking “all 
account records” for Ellipse and Buttars from January 1, 2007 to April 1, 2011. 
R818–20. Those records were produced with a custodial certification. 
Def.’sEvid.Hr’gEx.S. 
Buttars’ Motion to Suppress Bank Records 
 Buttars filed a motion to suppress the bank records, arguing that the 
records were obtained in violation of the United States and Utah 
constitutions. R766–67. Specifically, Buttars claimed that the subpoenas used 
to obtain the bank records were unlawful because they cited an inapplicable 
state statute requiring the banks not to disclose the existence of the subpoenas 
to “any person,” thereby denying Buttars the opportunity to learn of the 
subpoenas and attempt to quash them. R768–784. 
 The trial court denied the motion. First, it ruled that under the 
Subpoena Powers Act, the State was not required to give notice of the 
subpoenas to Buttars. Second, it ruled that the reference to the inapplicable 
state statute did not render the subpoenas unlawful, particularly where 
Buttars did not challenge the good cause statement or allege that the 
subpoenas were not reasonably related to the criminal investigation. Finally, 
the court ruled that even if the subpoenas were unconstitutional, the good 
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faith exception would preclude suppression. R1085–90 (written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law) (Addendum C); see also 3098–3104 (oral ruling). 
State’s Motion to Admit Summaries of Bank Records 
 The State moved for a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of summaries 
of the bank records prepared by the State’s financial expert John Curtis, a 
forensic accountant and certified fraud examiner. R734–36,862–65; see 
State’sTr.Ex.26–32 (Addendum D). Following two rounds of briefing and oral 
argument, and two findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court 
ruled that the bank records and the summaries were admissible. R1148–54 
(first written findings of fact and conclusions of law), 1216–23 (second) 
(Addendum E); see also 3180–3201 (first oral ruling), 3274–88 (second). 
 First, the trial court ruled that the bank records were “voluminous,” 
making rule 1006, Utah Rules of Evidence, applicable for admitting the 
summaries, so long as the bank records themselves were admissible. R1151; 
see also R2999 (Buttars did not challenge the summaries under rule 1006). 
 Second, the trial court ruled that the bank records were authentic under 
rule 901(b)(1) and (4), Utah Rules of Evidence, based on the certifications for 
most of the records, the testimony of Agent Nesbit who subpoenaed and 
personally received and reviewed the bank records, and the testimony of 
Curtis, who reviewed the records and concluded that they were complete and 
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authentic records. R1151–52; see R3002–07,3014–15 (“in every way they did 
appear to be the authentic documents”).  
 Finally, the court ruled that although the bank records were hearsay, 
they were admissible under an exception. R1152–53,1219–23. The court ruled 
that not all of the records were admissible under rule 803(6), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, because some did not come with a records custodian certificate. 
R1153. However, the court ruled that they were admissible under evidence 
rule 807 because they had equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness. R1219–23. And because the bank records were admissible 
evidence, the summaries of those records were also admissible. R1223,3287. 
Expert Testimony 
 The prosecution called two expert witnesses: Brian Lloyd, a securities 
expert, R4822–24, and John Curtis, a certified public accountant and certified 
fraud examiner with experience investigating financial fraud, and who 
reviewed and prepared summaries of the bank records, R5168–70,5172–75.  
 The prosecutor asked Lloyd, “Based on your experience in the 
securities industry, could you give some examples of what material 
statements may entail?” R4827. Defense counsel objected, arguing that it was 
improper to define material misstatement and that “the examples are going 
to be too closely related to this case.” R4827. The court ruled that it would be 
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inappropriate “to give examples that would include what was mentioned in 
this case,” but it allowed Lloyd to define material misstatement. R4830. Soon 
thereafter, the court called a sidebar and changed its ruling. Based on the 
court’s reading of the case law, it believed that an expert could give a “list of 
examples” of material facts “so long as it’s not explicitly tied to, or the words 
used, explicitly mirrors the allegations made in this case.” R4835–37. 
 Lloyd was again asked about “examples, in the securities industry, [of] 
what material information might include, just generally?” R4838. Lloyd 
responded with some general examples, including “information about the 
business,” its assets, management, financial information, and risks. R4838–
39. Lloyd also defined “material” as “information that a reasonable investor 
would consider important in making a decision whether to purchase or to sell 
a security,” R4830, and “information that’s important to an investor making 
a decision,” R4838. 
 The prosecutor asked Curtis whether there are “certain characteristics 
that you look for in analyzing a business or an individual to determine fraud, 
or theft, or deceit?” R5211. Defense counsel objected, essentially on the same 
basis as it objected to Lloyd’s testimony that the “characteristics” would 
“track closely with this case.” R5211. The prosecutor explained that he 
intended to ask Curtis (1) about general characteristics of fraud that he looks 
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for as an accountant; and (2) whether he saw any of those characteristics in 
this case. The prosecutor explained, however, that he would refrain from 
asking for an opinion about whether Buttars violated the law. R5217–23.   
 The court ruled that it would “allow the testimony” as proffered “so 
long as the questioning and the answers do not touch on…the ultimate 
question under Utah law, or under the statutes…as to what is fraudulent, 
what is securities fraud….The witness can testify about his understanding, 
what is the accepted standard and characteristics in the industry.” R5223–24. 
The trial court also ruled that the testimony of both Lloyd and Curtis would 
be helpful to the jury because they described aspects of the securities industry 
that are beyond the understanding of an ordinary juror. R5224–26. 
 Curtis proceeded to give examples of general characteristics that he 
looks for in his practice when analyzing possible fraud, including 
misrepresentations, disregard of corporate formalities, dependency on 
investor money, misuse of funds, and undercapitalization. R5227–28. He also 
testified that he had seen some of those characteristics in this case. R5228. 
*** 
 The jury convicted Buttars on all four securities fraud charges and the 
pattern of unlawful activity charges but acquitted on the four theft charges. 
R1432–33. Buttars timely appealed. R2587. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 I. The trial court did not err when it denied Buttars’ motion to 
suppress the bank records. The records were obtained by valid investigative 
subpoenas, issued under the Subpoena Powers Act and approved by a 
district court. The technical error did not make the subpoenas unlawful or the 
search unreasonable. And even if it did, suppression would not be 
appropriate because the officer reasonably relied on the district court’s 
approval of the subpoenas and the Act authorizing the search and seizure of 
Buttars’ bank records. 
 The trial court also did not abuse is discretion when it ruled that the 
bank records were admissible hearsay. Most of the records qualified for the 
business records exception, rule 803(6), and those that did not were 
admissible under rule 807 because they contained equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 
 II. Buttars claims his counsel was ineffective for three reasons: (1) for 
not objecting to the summaries of bank records under Utah Rules of Evidence 
1006 because they purportedly included information not contained in the 
bank records; (2) for proposing a jury instruction defining “willfully;” and (3) 
for not objecting to statements made by an expert, the prosecution, and the 
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jury instructions about making material omissions in the securities fraud 
context. Each claim fails.  
 First, it was objectively reasonable for counsel not to object to minor 
details in the summaries of bank records that accurately summarized the 
records, that were not inconsistent with evidence rule 1006 or case law, and 
that were obvious to the jury. Buttars has not proven prejudiced because the 
summaries were accurate, and the challenged information did not change the 
evidentiary picture. 
 Second, counsel acted reasonably when he proposed a jury instruction 
that contained language approved by this Court. And there was no prejudice 
for including this court-approved language, especially because it was not 
material to this case.  
 Third, counsel performed competently when he did not object to 
statements made by an expert, the prosecutor, and the jury instructions that 
used an abbreviated “material omissions” in lieu of the cumbersome 
statutory language about omissions “necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading.” Counsel could reasonably conclude that it was clear 
from other statements made during trial and the jury instructions as a whole 
that the few references to the abbreviated “material omissions” did not 
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supplant the legal standard for securities fraud. Buttars was not prejudiced 
because there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have ignored 
the clear jury instructions on the standard for omissions based on what was 
clearly convenient short-hand language. 
 III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted expert 
testimony that offered general definitions and conclusions consistent with 
evidence rule 704 and binding case law. The experts did not tie their opinions 
to Utah law or opine that Buttars was guilty of securities fraud. And any error 
was not prejudicial because the jury instructions clearly set forth the proper 
legal standards and informed the jury to weigh expert testimony the same as 
any other witness. 
 IV. Having failed to establish any error, Buttars’ cumulative error 
claim necessarily fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That the Bank Records Used 
to Show Buttars’ Fraudulent Activity Were Admissible. 
 Buttars’ securities fraud spanned several years and multiple bank 
accounts through which he transferred, commingled, and improperly spent 
investor funds. The trial court admitted into evidence seven summaries of 
bank records pursuant to rule 1006, Utah Rules of Evidence. State’sTr.Ex. 26–
32. Buttars argues that the summaries should have been excluded because the 
underlying bank records were inadmissible for two reasons. 
 First, he claims that the trial court should have suppressed the bank 
records because they were purportedly obtained in violation of the United 
States and Utah constitutions. Aplt.Br.18–31. Second, he argues that the bank 
records were inadmissible hearsay. Aplt.Br.31–42. The trial court correctly 
rejected both of these arguments. 
A. The search and seizure of the bank records did not violate 
Buttars’ state or federal constitutional rights. 
 The State obtained the bank records of Buttars, Ellipse, and MovieBlitz 
through three subpoenas issued under the Subpoena Powers Act.1 See R797–
                                              
1 The full name of the Act is “Subpoena Powers for Aid of Criminal 
Investigation and Grants of Immunity.” Utah Code Ann. 77-22-1 et. seq. 
(West 2018). The State will refer to it as the “Subpoena Powers Act” or the 
“Act.” 
-22- 
99, 818–20, 834–36. Buttars argues that the seizure of his bank records by 
subpoena violated his rights under both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. Aplt.Br.18–25. Both the state and federal constitutional 
provisions guard “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; accord Utah Const. art. I, §14. 
But neither was violated with the seizure of the bank records. 
1. The Fourth Amendment does not protect bank records. 
 The Fourth Amendment claim is a non-starter. Although Buttars cites 
the Fourth Amendment he does not cite to any case law supporting his claim 
that the seizure of his bank records by subpoena violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights. Indeed, he cannot. The United States Supreme Court has 
foreclosed the issue by holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
bank records. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–45 (1976). Much like 
the defendant in Miller, Buttars has “no protectable Fourth Amendment 
interest in the subpoenaed documents.” Id. at 437. 
2. The search and seizure of the bank records did not violate 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.  
 Buttars’ state constitutional challenge also fails. Article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution “reads nearly verbatim” with and has almost always 
been interpreted identically to the Fourth Amendment. State v. Thompson, 810 
P.2d 415, 416–17 (Utah 1991). One of the rare circumstances in which it has 
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been interpreted differently is with respect to bank records. Unlike the Fourth 
Amendment, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted article I, section 14 to 
extend the “right of privacy” to “bank records,” at least “under the facts of 
[one] case.” Id. at 418.  
 In Thompson, the attorney general issued subpoenas “under the 
Subpoena Powers Act to defendants’ bankers, accountants, business 
associates, and several corporations.” Id. at 416. In a related case, one of the 
corporations challenged the validity of the subpoenas and the court held that 
the Act was unconstitutionally applied. Id. at 416, 418; see In re Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 658–59 (Utah 1988). The Thompson defendants 
argued that the trial court erroneously denied their motion to suppress the 
bank records obtained by those same subpoenas. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 415–
16. The court held that because the subpoenas had been issued in an 
unconstitutional manner, they were unlawful, and the evidence obtained 
against the Thompson defendants should have been suppressed. Id. at 418–19; 
see Schroeder v. Utah Attorney General’s Office, 2015 UT 77, ¶23, 358 P.3d 1075. 
 The Utah Supreme Court later emphasized that the Thompson “opinion 
explicitly restricts the holding to ‘the facts of [that] case.’” Schroeder, 2015 UT 
77, ¶24 (quoting Thompson, 810 P.2d at 418). And the facts of that case 
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included the seizure of bank records by subpoenas issued without judicial 
oversight—a critical fact that does not exist in this case. 
 The supreme court in Schroeder explained that the Thompson decision 
“stands for the unremarkable proposition that there is no violation of article 
I, section 14 when the state obtains bank records through a reasonable search 
and seizure.” Id. “A state intrusion is not unreasonable…when the state acts 
under a valid…subpoena.” Id. ¶22. Thus, “whatever ‘right of privacy’ 
individuals may have in their bank records, the Utah Constitution permits 
the state to intrude upon it ‘pursuant to a subpoena’ that is ‘lawfully issued’ 
to a bank.” Id. ¶24 (quoting Thompson, 810 P.2d at 418).  
 The search and seizure of Buttars’ bank records was not unreasonable 
because the records were obtained through valid, lawful investigatory 
subpoenas approved by the district court under the Subpoena Powers Act. 
 Investigatory subpoenas are “not subject to the same probable cause 
requirements as a search warrant.” Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 916 (10th Cir. 
2007). Rather, to be constitutionally “reasonable” they need only be 
“’sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive.’” 
Id. at 916 (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)).  
 The Subpoena Powers Act is consistent with these “minimal 
requirements” of reasonableness. Id. at 917. The Act permits a prosecutor to 
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“conduct a criminal investigation” “upon application and approval of the 
district court and for good cause shown.” Utah Code Ann. §77-22-2(2)(a) 
(West 2018). After judicial approval, a prosecutor may “subpoena witnesses” 
and “require the production” of anything that “may be relevant to the 
investigation.” Id. §77-22-2(3)(a). The prosecutor must “apply to the district 
court for each subpoena” and “show that the requested information is 
reasonably related to the criminal investigation authorized by the court.” Id. 
§77-22-2(3)(b).  
 The three subpoenas here were properly issued according to these 
requirements—the district court approved the investigation upon a showing 
of good cause, the prosecutor applied to the district court for each subpoena, 
and the district court authorized each one. R1088–89. Buttars does not argue 
otherwise. The subpoenas were therefore “valid,” making the “intrusion” of 
Buttars’ bank records “not unreasonable.” Schroeder, 2015 UT 77, ¶22. 
 Buttars, however, claims the subpoenas were unlawful because he was 
not given notice. Aplt.Br.19–25. The Act does not require that notice be given 
to a target of the investigation or that he be given the opportunity to challenge 
it before the subpoenaed party complies. And Buttars has not pointed to any 
case law that has interpreted the Act to impose such a requirement, let alone 
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that a failure to do so makes the subpoena “unlawful” or the seizure 
“unreasonable” and mandates suppression of the evidence obtained. 
 Critically, Buttars has never challenged the good cause basis for the 
investigation, or the bank records’ relevance to that investigation—the only 
factors that could make the subpoena unlawful or the seizure unreasonable. 
Because the subpoenas complied with the requirements of the Act, including 
judicial approval, they were not unlawful. 
 Buttars erroneously relies on cases interpreting a prior version of the 
Act, and procedures for obtaining subpoenas under rule 45, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Neither argument has merit. 
 First, Buttars relies on Thompson and In re Criminal Investigation, which 
were decided under a prior version of the Act. Neither of these cases held that 
the Act requires notice to targets of investigations. Indeed, Buttars concedes 
that the validity of the subpoenas in these cases hinged on how they affected 
“the subpoenaed party’s ability to mount a meaningful pre-compliance 
challenge.” Aplt.Br.21 (emphasis added); see In re Criminal Investigation, 754 
P.2d at 656 (“subpoenaed person must have a meaningful opportunity to 
challenge the lawfulness of a subpoena”). 
 Moreover, the critical problem with the Act under which those 
subpoenas were issued is that the Act did not require judicial oversight. 
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Moreover, each subpoena falsely represented that it had in fact been 
authorized by court order. See In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 658–59. 
In response, the legislature enacted “a significant overhauling of the Act” to 
incorporate “the substantive and procedural safeguards read into the Act in 
In re Criminal Investigation.” Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1998). 
The amendments specifically addressed the court’s concern about the lack of 
judicial oversight—the Act now requires court approval of each subpoena 
before it is issued to ensure that the “requested information is reasonably 
related to the criminal investigation authorized by the court.” Utah Code 
Ann. §77-22-2(3)(b). Much like a magistrate’s approval of a warrant, the 
district court’s approval of the subpoena ensures that the seizure comports 
with procedural safeguards of the Act. This pre-issuance authorization 
satisfies the “minimal” reasonableness requirements for investigatory 
subpoenas. See Becker, 494 F.3d at 916–17. 
 Consistent with the amendments, the subpoenas in this case were 
individually authorized by the district court after the court determined that 
the evidence sought was reasonably related to the previously approved 
investigation. R1088–89. The subpoenas were valid. 
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 Buttars next relies on the notice requirement for subpoenas under rule 
45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But rule 45 does not govern here; the 
Subpoena Powers Act does.  
 The Subpoena Powers Act “can be used by the State only prior to the 
filing of formal criminal charges.” Gutierrez, 972 P.2d at 917. After charges are 
filed, the state must obtain subpoenas through rule 14, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which incorporates some of the procedures from civil rule 45, 
including “the content, issuance, and service of subpoenas to the extent that 
those provisions are consistent with the” criminal rules. Utah R. Crim. P. 
14(c). This includes civil rule 45’s requirement that notice be given to 
opposing parties “before serving the subpoena.” Utah R. Civ. P. 45(b)(3); see 
State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ¶41, 125 P.3d 878 (holding that rule 45’s notice 
requirement “applies to criminal matters where privileged information is at 
stake”); Utah R. Crim. P. 14 adv. comm. note (“subsection (c) clarifies the 
applicability of Rule 45…as addressed in State v. Gonzales.”). 
 Because the subpoenas here were issued before charges were filed and 
in compliance with the Subpoena Powers Act, neither criminal rule 14 nor 
civil rule 45 and its notice provision apply. The lack of notice, therefore, does 
not make the subpoenas unlawful or the seizure of the bank records 
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unreasonable when they complied with the terms of the Subpoena Powers 
Act, including obtaining a district court’s approval.  
 Buttars argues that under rule 45 case law, the lack of notice is 
constitutionally significant. But unlike subpoenas issued under the Subpoena 
Powers Act, which require judicial approval of the overall investigation and 
of each subpoena, rule 45 subpoenas are issued by a party without any 
judicial oversight. Utah R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2) (“An attorney admitted to practice 
in Utah may issue and sign a subpoena as an officer of the court”). That 
procedural difference is meaningful. It was the lack of judicial approval 
under the prior version of the Act that concerned the court. See In re Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d at 658–59. And that concern was remedied in a 
subsequent amendment. The judicial approval works to protect Buttars from 
an unreasonable search and seizure of his bank records, much like a court-
approved warrant. See Becker, 494 F.3d at 916–17.  
 Rule 45 also contains procedures for challenging a subpoena, but only 
for specific reasons. Utah R. Civ. P. 45(e)(3). Similar procedures are not 
present in the Subpoena Powers Act. This too is a significant difference that 
Buttars does not attempt to analyze. And Buttars has not identified any of the 
listed reasons in rule 45 as a basis for challenging the subpoenas.  
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 Finally, Buttars argues that the lack of notice was exacerbated because 
the subpoenas “erroneously included [a] secrecy provision” that prevented 
the banks from notifying Buttars of the subpoenas. Aplt.Br.23–25.  
 The trial court found that each subpoena “contained references to an 
irrelevant section of the Utah Criminal Code” that prohibited the banks “from 
disclosing the subpoenas to any third party.” R1086. The trial court ruled that 
although this “was an error,” it “did not make the subpoenas unlawful or 
unreasonable” because the state complied with the Act by obtaining court 
approval for the investigation and for each subpoena. R1086,1088–89.  
 The trial court noted that even without the erroneous language, “there 
is no evidence that [Buttars] would have known about the subpoenas.” 
R1089. Buttars posits that Frontier would have been subject to California law 
that prohibits banks from disclosing financial records without notice to the 
customer whose records are sought. Aplt.Br.24. But this was a subpoena 
issued under Utah law and served on a bank in Utah. Buttars offers no 
explanation as to why California law would govern in this scenario.  
 Moreover, the Act has its own secrecy provision, but it does not act as 
a notice provision. The Act permits a prosecutor to apply for the district court 
to order the subpoena and the substance of the evidence obtained to be kept 
secret. Utah Code Ann. §77-22-2(6)(a). It authorizes secrecy upon “showing a 
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reasonable likelihood that publicly releasing information about the identity 
of a witness or the substance of the evidence resulting from a subpoena or 
interrogation would pose a threat of harm to a person or otherwise impede 
the investigation.” Id. §77-22-2(6)(a)(i). The purpose of the secrecy provision 
is not to prevent notice to interested parties who would otherwise have 
notice; as explained, the Act does not require notice to anyone but the 
subpoenaed party. Rather, as the trial court concluded, the purpose of the 
secrecy provision is “to protect the innocent and to prevent criminal suspects 
from having access to information prior to prosecution,” but it does not create 
a right to pre-compliance notice or pre-compliance challenges. R1089. 
 In sum, the subpoenas were issued in compliance with the Subpoena 
Powers Act—they were approved by the district court after concluding that 
they were “reasonably related to the criminal investigation authorized by the 
court.” See Utah Code Ann. §77-22-2(3)(b). The Act requires nothing more for 
the subpoenas to be valid and lawful. Obtaining Buttars’ bank records was 
not unreasonable and did not violate the Utah Constitution because “the state 
act[ed] under a valid…subpoena” “that [was] ‘lawfully issued’ to a bank.” 
Schroeder, 2015 UT 77, ¶¶22, 24 (quoting Thompson, 810 P.2d at 418). 
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3. Even if the subpoenas were unlawful, suppression would 
not be appropriate. 
 Even assuming arguendo that the subpoenas violated the Utah 
Constitution, suppression is not merited. The State acknowledges that the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that “‘exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14.’” 
Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419 (quoting State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 
1990)). However, the State disputes the validity of those holdings and 
maintains that they should be overturned.2 And even if exclusion is a remedy 
under the Utah Constitution, the good faith exception should apply. 
a. The Utah Constitution does not require an exclusionary 
remedy for violations of article I, section 14. 
 Utah courts will not hesitate to overturn prior precedent that is 
“erroneous,” “no longer sound,” or that lacked meaningful analysis. State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). (cleaned up). Such is the case in 
Thompson, and in the Larocco plurality opinion upon which it relied. 
 In adopting a state exclusionary rule, Thompson did not assess the text 
or history of article I, section 14, and failed to acknowledge, much less 
                                              
2 The State also acknowledges that this Court is bound to follow Utah 
Supreme Court precedent but makes this argument for purposes of 
preservation. 
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explain, why it was departing from long-standing precedent rejecting a state 
exclusionary rule.  
 In State v. Aime, 220 P. 704, 706–08 (1923)—an opinion issued just 
twenty-seven years after the Utah Constitution’s adoption in 1896—the Utah 
Supreme Court held that excluding evidence for an article I, section 14 
violation by police is neither constitutionally required, nor appropriate as a 
remedy in a criminal trial. The court later reaffirmed Aime, holding “that 
evidence, even though illegally obtained, is admissible.” State v. Fair, 353 P.2d 
615, 615 (1960). 
 Thompson failed to cite Aime and Fair altogether. And it was bereft of 
analysis. Instead, it quoted the Larocco plurality opinion as if it were binding 
precedent, completely overlooking that (1) the Larocco opinion garnered the 
support of only two justices, (2) the Aime holding had been undisturbed for 
almost 70 years, and (3) excluding evidence had never been recognized as a 
remedy for a violation of the nearly 100-year-old state constitution.  
 Larocco’s reasoning fares no better. While the Larocco plurality 
acknowledged this Court’s rejection of a state exclusionary rule in both Aime 
and Fair, it did not discuss, let alone examine, Aime’s underlying rationale for 
rejecting a state exclusionary rule. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471. Nor did it discuss 
article I, section 14’s text or history. 
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 Thompson’s and Larocco’s “lack of acknowledgement of authority and 
its weak analytical underpinnings” beg for reconsideration. Menzies, 889 P.2d 
at 400. When interpreting the Utah Constitution, this Court begins with “the 
text’s plain meaning,” informed with “historical evidence of the framers’ 
intent.” American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶10, 140 P.3d 
1235. 
 Nowhere in the text of article I, section 14 does it require the exclusion 
of evidence. This point was made in Aime after detailing the reasoning of 
courts from four sister states that had rejected a state exclusionary rule. Aime, 
220 P. at 706–07. And it is supported by evidence of the framer’s intent. At or 
near the time of the framing, a person subjected to an unlawful search or 
seizure was entitled to a “claim for the restoration of [his] property, and for 
the punishment of the trespasser or the announcement that the citizen may 
defend against such intrusion.” Id. at 707 (cleaned up). Thus, “the redress of 
grievances for invasion of constitutional rights” did not lie in the exclusion of 
evidence at the defendant’s criminal trial but rested with “the usual and 
adequate provisions of the civil and criminal law.” Id. (cleaned up). 
 In sum, neither the text of the Utah Constitution nor the historical 
evidence relevant to the framers’ understanding of the constitutional text 
supports an exclusionary remedy for violations of article I, section 14.  
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b. Assuming the applicability of the exclusionary rule for 
violations of the State constitution, this Court should 
recognize and apply a good-faith exception to preclude 
suppression. 
 Even if suppression is the appropriate remedy for an illegal search and 
seizure under the Utah Constitution, and assuming the Court finds that 
obtaining the bank records by subpoena was unlawful, suppression is 
improper under the good-faith exception, as the trial court ruled. R1089–90.  
 The Utah Supreme Court has yet to decide whether there is a good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. See Thompson, 810, P.2d 419–20. But there is a federal good-faith 
exception where there is no unlawful police conduct to deter. United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984). The Supreme Court has recognized 
situations relevant here where exclusion is not appropriate because there was 
no misconduct on the part of police. 
 First, Leon established that “when an officer acting with objective good 
faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted 
within its scope,” suppression is inappropriate even if the warrant is later 
invalidated. Id. This is because “[i]t is the magistrate's responsibility to 
determine whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause” and “to 
issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 921. Moreover, “an officer cannot be expected to question 
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the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form 
of the warrant is technically sufficient.” Id. Exclusion of evidence under such 
circumstances is undeserved because it penalizes “the officer for the 
magistrate's error, rather than his own,” which “cannot logically contribute 
to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id.; see also Massachusetts 
v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989–90 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply 
when officer relies in good faith on magistrate’s approval of form of warrant 
that contained technical error); State v. Dominguez, 2011 UT 11, ¶¶18–20, 248 
P.3d 473 (no exclusion where “[e]verything [officer] did was authorized by 
the rules” governing obtaining warrants but magistrate committed technical 
violation). 
 Second, the Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception to when 
an officer acts “in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute” that authorizes 
a warrantless administrative search even if the statute is later held to be 
unconstitutional, again, because the officer bears no fault in relying on the 
legislature’s enactment of an invalid statute. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342, 
349–50 (1987). 
 Although the bank records here were obtained by subpoena rather 
than a warrant, this case demonstrates an intersection of both of these good-
faith situations. The only error in the subpoenas that Buttars identifies is the 
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reference to the irrelevant statute prohibiting the bank from disclosing the 
subpoena to other. But that language was inserted by a paralegal and the 
form of the subpoenas were approved by the district court. Agent Nesbit 
reasonably relied both on the district court’s approval of the subpoena and 
“his judgment that the form” of it was “technically sufficient,” Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 921. He also reasonably relied on the statutory authority to obtain the bank 
records without a warrant by following the procedures outlined in the 
Subpoena Powers Act. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 349–50. 
 Buttars does not challenge the trial court’s finding of good-faith 
reliance by Agent Nesbit. He merely argues that the exception should not 
apply based on his mistaken reliance on Thompson and State v. Yount, 2008 UT 
App 102, ¶11, 182 P.3d 405. Aplt.Br.25–27. Once again, Buttars fails to 
consider the significant differences between those cases and the present one.  
 The Thompson court determined that the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, if it exists under the Utah Constitution, did not apply in 
that case because there was no “objectively reasonable reliance” on a 
magistrate’s approval of the subpoenas. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419–20. Rather, 
the subpoenas were approved by the attorney general consistent with the 
Subpoena Powers Act at the time. Id. As explained above, the Act has since 
changed, requiring judicial approval of every subpoena, which was obtained 
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in this case. Thus, the rationale for rejecting a good-faith exception in 
Thompson does not exist here.  
 Yount is similarly inapplicable because those subpoenas were issued 
under civil rule 45, not the Subpoena Powers Act. 2008 UT App 102, ¶11. And 
as explained, rule 45 also requires no judicial oversight upon which one could 
reasonably rely. 
*** 
 In sum, the bank records were obtained by a valid, lawful subpoena 
properly issued under the Subpoena Powers Act. If invalid, suppression is 
not warranted. The trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress. This 
Court should affirm. 
B. The bank records were admissible under exceptions to the rule 
against hearsay. 
 Buttars argues that the summaries of bank records were inadmissible 
because the underlying bank records were inadmissible hearsay. Aplt.Br.31–
40. The trial court admitted the bank records under evidence rule 807 because 
the records “were lawfully obtained through subpoena,” they had “been 
properly authenticated,” and they satisfied “each of the four prongs of the 
residual hearsay exception.” R1216–23.  
 There is no dispute that the bank records are hearsay—an out-of-court 
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Utah R. Evid. 801(c). 
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But hearsay statements are admissible if they meet one of the many 
exceptions that establish the reliability of the statements. Id. at 802. The bank 
records were properly admitted because they met one or more exceptions. 
1. The majority of the bank records were admissible under 
Utah Rules of Evidence 803(6). 
 The trial court initially ruled that the bank records were not admissible 
under the traditional hearsay exception for bank records—rule 803(6), Utah 
Rules of Evidence—because some of the records were received without the 
necessary custodial certificates. R1153. But the majority of the records were 
properly certified and should have been ruled admissible under that 
exception. 
 Under rule 803(6), records of regularly conducted activity, like bank or 
other business records, are admissible hearsay. Utah R. Evid. 803(6). To 
qualify for this exception, the proponent of the records must show that they 
were “made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—
someone with knowledge” and that they were “kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted activity” and as part of “a regular practice of that 
activity.” Id. These conditions must be established by either “the testimony of 
the custodian or another qualified witness,” or by “a certification” consistent 
with evidence rule 902(11) or (12). Id. Finally, “neither the source of 
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information nor the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack 
of trustworthiness.” Id.  
 The majority of the bank records should have been deemed admissible 
under this exception. The bank records were obtained through three 
subpoenas. R2944–55,2962. Agent Nesbitt received the bank records, 
reviewed them, summarized them in his police report, and believed they 
were complete. R2947–49,2967.  
 The first was served on Frontier and requested records for Ellipse and 
Buttars. R797–99. Frontier produced a batch of records with a custodial 
declaration that met each of the requirements of rule 803(6). R803. Agent 
Nesbitt sent Frontier a letter noting that some records were missing. 
R838,2950,2995. Frontier then produced a second batch of records, again with 
a proper custodial declaration. R804. Agent Nesbitt also received duplicate 
productions in the mail. R2947–48. 
 The second subpoena was served on Chase requesting records for 
Ellipse and Buttars. R818–20. Chase produced the relevant records with a 
custodial declaration. Def.’sEvid.Hr’gEx.S; see R1221. 
 The third subpoena was served on Frontier, requesting records for 
MovieBlitz and Mark LaCount. R834–36. Frontier produced the records by 
secure email but without a custodial declaration. Def.’sEvid.Hr’gEx.P.  
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 Buttars challenged the admissibility of only the Frontier records under 
rule 803(6) because there were only two custodial certificates for the three 
batches of records obtained, but he did not challenge the Chase records 
because they came with proper certification. See R910–23; see R1221. Thus, the 
admissibility of the Chase records is not at issue. Moreover, the first two 
batches of Frontier records came with proper certification and should have 
been deemed admissible under rule 803(6). See R1221 (“the State does have 
certificates for some of the Frontier bank records”). 
 Thus, the trial court should have ruled that all the records for Ellipse 
and Buttars from both banks were admissible because they met the 
requirements of rule 803(6). And this Court can affirm on any ground 
apparent in the record. Baily v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶10, 52 P.3d 1158. 
 Only the last batch of records from Frontier, records for the accounts of 
MovieBlitz and Mark LaCount, lacked custodial certification and failed to 
qualify under the business records exception. But these records were 
properly admitted under Utah Rules of Evidence 807. 
2. The bank records were also admissible under Utah Rules 
of Evidence 807. 
 All the bank records were admissible under rule 807, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, as the trial court ruled. R1216–23. The purpose of rule 807, or the 
“residual exception,” is to provide for the admissibility of hearsay that “does 
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not fit into a recognized exception” but “its admission is justified by the 
inherent reliability of the statement and the need for its admission.” State v. 
Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989). 
 Under rule 807, a hearsay statement not otherwise admissible under 
another hearsay exception is admissible if four conditions are satisfied: 
 (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness; 
 (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
 (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through 
reasonable efforts; and 
 (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of [the rules of 
evidence] and the interests of justice.   
Utah R. Evid. 807(a). In addition, the opposing party must be given 
“reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement and its particulars.” Id. 
at 807(b).  
 Courts routinely use the residual exception to admit bank records that 
lack custodial certifications or otherwise fail under the business records 
exception. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 233–35 (3rd Cir. 2013) 
(no error admitting uncertified bank records that trial court found to be 
authentic and trustworthy); United States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 374–76 & n.5 
(5th Cir. 2001) (no error admitting bank records under rule 807 even though 
they were incomplete, contained clerical errors, and had an “indirect chain of 
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custody;” such issues go to weight of evidence, not admissibility), abrogated 
on other grounds by Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005); United States 
v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1127 (1st Cir. 1989) (bank records admissible under 
residual exception after failing under rule 803(6)); Karme v. Comm’r, 673 F.2d 
1062, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 1982) (same).3 Like these courts, the trial court 
appropriately admitted the records here after finding that the bank records 
met each of rule 807’s requirements. 
 First, the records have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.” Utah R. Evid. 807(a)(1). The trial court recognized that all 
of the Chase records and some of the Frontier records came with custodial 
certificates that establish the trustworthiness and reliability of the records. 
R1221. Even the records that lacked a custodial certification were provided 
by Frontier in response to a subpoena and sent through a secure email. The 
records were obtained through a known, reliable source—they came directly 
from the banks. There has never been any evidence to suggest that the records 
are anything other than “what the proponent claims” they are—actual bank 
                                              
3 Buttars cites only a single unpublished extra-jurisdictional decision to 
the contrary. See Aplt.Br.36. Even that case is distinguishable because there 
“no effort whatever was made to authenticate the document or to prove the 
foundation requirements for its admissibility as a business record.” Clifton v. 
Gusto Records, Inc., 852 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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records created and maintained by a federally regulated bank. See Utah R. 
Evid. 901(a). The trial court correctly ruled that the bank records were 
authentic. R1151–52,1220–22.  
 Ruling that the records are authentic provides guarantees of 
trustworthiness equivalent to a custodial certification, because the purpose of 
the certificates is solely to establish the authenticity of the records. See Utah 
R. Evid. 902(11). And Buttars does not challenge the trial court’s ruling that 
the records are authentic. Because the records are authentic, they are 
inherently reliable and trustworthy. See Turner, 718 F.3d at 234 (bank records 
found to be trustworthy for the same reasons the records were found to be 
authentic); United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202 (3rd Cir. 1992) (“bank 
documents…provide circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness because 
the banks and their customers rely on their accuracy in the course of their 
business”).  
 Buttars argues that a hearsay statement that fails under a specific 
exception can never be admissible under rule 807 because its trustworthiness 
is not “equivalent” to the specific exception if failed to meet. Aplt.Br.37. But 
that is contrary to the purpose of the rule. Evidence admitted under rule 807 
by definition failed under every other exception because rule 807 is only 
available when the evidence “does not fit into a recognized exception.” 
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Nelson, 777 P.2d at 482; see United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 83–84 (4th Cir. 
1993) (“this circuit and others have admitted evidence under the residual 
exception when that evidence was inadmissible under one of the specified 
exceptions”); United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 573 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding 
that residual exception “is not limited in availability as to types of evidence 
not addressed in the other exceptions,” but “is also available when the 
proponent fails to meet the standards set forth in the other exceptions”).  
 Just because a statement may not have met the technical requirements 
of a specific exception does not mean that it is not equivalently trustworthy 
for some other reason. That is the whole point of rule 807—to provide for 
admissibility of reliable, trustworthy hearsay when a specific exception does 
not work. Buttars’ interpretation of the rule would contravene its purpose of 
focusing on the trustworthiness and reliability of the evidence and instead 
turn the question into whether evidence was “close enough” to another 
exception that the residual exception does not apply, regardless of the 
statement’s trustworthiness. As noted above, courts routinely admit bank 
records under rule 807 even if they are inadmissible under rule 803(6) because 
they lack the proper certification.  
 State v. Clopten does not support Buttars’ argument to the contrary. 
Clopten argued that prior statements of another person were admissible 
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under rule 804(b)(3) and rule 807. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶¶16–18, 23, 362 P.3d 
1216. After rejecting the admission of the statements under rule 804(b)(3), the 
court also rejected them under rule 807. Id. ¶22, 24. The court held that rule 
807 did not apply because Clopten had “not shown that the statements have 
‘equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness’ that are different 
from other recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id. ¶24. The reference 
to “different” guarantees of trustworthiness does not imply that a statement 
that is close to meeting a specific exception but fails cannot be admissible 
under rule 807. Indeed, the court considered the admissibility of the 
statement under rule 807 even after rejecting it under rule 804(b)(3). The court 
was merely saying that to be admissible under rule 807, the statement must 
be trustworthy even though it “does not fit into a recognized exception.” 
Nelson, 777 P.2d at 482. In other words, if a statement qualifies as trustworthy 
under a particular exception, the court need not look for a “different” reason 
to admit it under rule 807.  
 Buttars, citing Clopten, also argues that the trial court improperly relied 
on “extrinsic evidence” to support admission under rule 807 when it credited 
the testimony of Agent Nesbit and John Curtis. Aplt.Br.37. Clopten argued 
that a witness’ hearsay statement exonerating Clopten of murder were 
trustworthy because it was corroborated in part by the descriptions of the 
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killer by other witnesses. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶25. But the court held that 
trustworthiness cannot be determined by other evidence “unrelated to the 
hearsay statements,” such as the testimony of others that are consistent with 
the hearsay. Id. Rather, trustworthiness under rule 807 is typically satisfied 
by evidence about the hearsay statement itself—“the circumstances in which 
the hearsay statement was made or the content of the statement itself to 
determine whether the declarant would be unlikely to lie.” Id. 
The bank records, however, are unlike the oral statements in Clopten 
that were made by a person who could lie. And the evidence relied on to 
establish their trustworthiness is also much different. The trial court did not 
look to unrelated evidence; it correctly relied on intrinsic evidence about the 
bank records themselves—testimony about the circumstances under which 
the records were obtained and of their content, as well as the custodial 
certificates about how they were made—which show that the records are 
“unlikely to lie.” See id. The trial court did not err in relying on this evidence 
related to the bank records to support a finding of trustworthiness. 
Second, the records were offered as evidence of a material fact. Utah R. 
Evid. 807(a)(2). Buttars does not challenge this element. Aplt.Br.33. Nor could 
he, as the bank records were material to the State’s case that Buttars 
committed securities fraud. See R1222. 
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 Third, the bank records were “more probative on the point for which 
[they were] offered than any other evidence that the proponent [could] obtain 
through reasonable efforts.” Utah R. Evid. 807(a)(3). Buttars argues that bank 
records with custodial certification would be more probative than bank 
records without it. But the custodial certificates are not the evidence. The 
bank records are the evidence. And there was no more probative evidence to 
establish Buttars’ use of investor funds. As the trial court stated, “There is no 
other evidence that can be presented or obtained through other reasonable 
means or efforts to show what happened to investor funds, which is a vital 
question in this case.” R1222; see also Nivica, 887 F.2d at 1127 (bank records 
“status as the best—indeed, the only—available proof of…financial 
activity…was irrefragable”). 
 Fourth, the trial court correctly determined that admitting the bank 
records would serve the purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests 
of justice. R1222–23; see Utah R. Evid. 807(a)(4). Buttars challenges this prong 
by returning to his claim that the records were untrustworthy without the 
custodial certificates. This prong, however, is different than trustworthiness. 
It is about whether admitting evidence that is trustworthy but does not meet 
a specific hearsay exception is consistent with the purpose of the rules of 
evidence and the interests of justice.  
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 The bank records were deemed authentic and trustworthy. R1220–22. 
The trial court said, “A jury trial is a search for truth.” R1222. And the rules 
of evidence are to be construed “to the end of ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.” Utah R. Evid. 102. Thus, the trial court 
correctly ruled that “[t]he purposes of the rules and the interests of justice 
[are] met when trustworthy, relevant information and evidence is admitted 
to assist the jury in the search for the truth.” R1223; accord R2581 (“Omitting 
the bank records when they have been shown to be authentic and legally 
obtained would frustrate the fact-finding purpose of the trial by keeping 
relevant and trustworthy evidence away from the jury.”) There was no error 
in that assessment. 
 Finally, the prosecution gave Buttars “reasonable notice of the intent to 
offer the statement and its particulars” so that he had “a fair opportunity to 
meet it.” Utah R. Evid. 807(b). This includes “notice that a proponent intends 
to rely on the residual exception as a basis for admitting hearsay.” State v. 
Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ¶¶21–22, 32 P.3d 976. The prosecution gave the 
requisite notice. Although the prosecution originally argued that the bank 
records were admissible under evidence rules 803(6) and 703, the prosecution 
also argued for its admissibility under rule 807. R1143–44. Buttars availed 
himself of the opportunity to challenge admission under rule 807 in written 
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form, R1168–70, and at oral argument, R3240–42. For that reason, the trial 
court correctly ruled that Buttars “had a fair opportunity to respond to the 
State’s argument for admission under” rule 807. R1220. 
 Buttars argues notice was insufficient because it was not given until 
after the evidentiary hearing. Aplt.Br.34. The rule requires reasonable notice 
“before the trial or hearing” at which the statements will be offered as 
evidence. Utah R. Evid. 807(b). The issue was raised and argued several 
months before trial “where it is anticipated that the evidence will be given,” 
R3280, and Buttars had “further opportunities” to challenge the evidence “at 
trial,” giving Buttars “a substantial amount of time to prepare to meet the 
evidence at trial,” R1220. 
 Moreover, Buttars does not proffer what additional information could 
have been obtained to challenge the trustworthiness of the bank records if he 
were given even more advanced notice. The notice was “reasonable,” given 
“before the trial,” and provided Buttars a “fair opportunity” to challenge the 
admissibility of the records. The trial court did not err when it ruled that 
notice was proper. 
 In sum, admission of the bank records was “justified by the inherent 
reliability of the statement and the need for its admission.” Nelson, 777 P.2d 
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at 482. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that they were 
admissible under rule 807. 
3. Buttars cannot show prejudice because if the trial court had 
ruled that the records were not admissible under rule 807, 
the prosecution would have called a witness to testify as 
required by rule 803(6). 
 Proof of prejudice requires a showing of a reasonable likelihood that 
the admission of the evidence altered the verdict. State v. Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶41, 
417 P.3d 86. “Prejudice analysis is counterfactual.” Id. ¶42. It requires a court 
to consider “an alternative universe” without the error. Id. If the court 
concludes “that the result would have been the same absent the error, no 
prejudice has occurred.” State v. Ring, 2018 UT 19, ¶36, 424 P.3d 845. 
 Here, the prosecution sought to admit the bank records under evidence 
rule 703, or alternatively, rule 807. Under either rule, the prosecution did not 
need custodial certificates. The trial court ruled that the records were 
admissible under rule 807 several months before trial. But had the trial court 
ruled they were not admissible under rule 807, the prosecution would have 
had several months to make other arrangements for the records’ 
admissibility. In this “alternate universe” the prosecution could have either 
gone back to the bank to obtain custodial certifications or called a witness to 
testify and establish the requirements of rule 803(6). There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that this could not have been accomplished had the trial 
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court required it. See State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, ¶¶31–42, 365 P.3d 699 
(holding erroneous admission of phone records was not prejudicial where 
prosecution had alternative method for admitting phone records that was 
“unnecessary” to raise because “the first one it tried…succeeded”). 
 Thus, even if the trial court erred in admitting the records under rule 
807, Buttars has not proven that a contrary ruling would have resulted in the 
exclusion of the bank records. The result at trial would have been the same 
absent any error because the bank records, and by extension the summaries, 
would have been admitted through alternative means. 
II. 
Buttars Has Failed to Meet the Difficult Burden of Proving 
That His Counsel Was Ineffective. 
 Buttars asserts three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he 
contends that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the summaries of 
bank records because they purportedly violated rule 1006, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Aplt.Br.42–49. Second, he argues that his counsel was ineffective 
for proposing an allegedly erroneous definition of “willfully” that was 
included in the jury instructions. Aplt.Br.49–60. Third, he argues that counsel 
was ineffective for not objecting to expert testimony, the prosecutor’s closing 
argument, and a jury instruction that each allegedly misstated the law about 
making material omissions in the securities fraud context. Aplt.Br.60–66. 
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Buttars has not succeeded in meeting his heavy burden of proving ineffective 
assistance of counsel for any of his three claims. 
 To make the requisite showing of constitutional ineffectiveness, 
Buttars must establish both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 697 (1984). This standard is “highly 
demanding.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986). And 
surmounting it “is never an easy task.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 
(2011) (cleaned up). 
For the deficient performance element, Strickland’s guiding principle is 
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (“[T]he proper standard for 
attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.”). So long as 
counsel acts reasonably, Buttars has received the sort of assistance that the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees.  
The analysis examines reasonableness “considering all the 
circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. It is “difficult” to prove 
ineffectiveness “when counsel’s overall performance indicates active and 
capable advocacy.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 111; see also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 386 
(holding that “[i]t will generally be appropriate for a reviewing court to assess 
counsel’s overall performance throughout the case in order” to decide 
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deficient performance element, and chiding the lower courts for 
“inadvisabl[y]” failing to do so). 
 Review of counsel’s performance “must be highly deferential.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This begins with a “strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.” Id. Such latitude is necessary because “[e]ven the best criminal 
defense attorneys would not” necessarily “defend a particular client in the 
same way,” meaning that there are “countless ways to provide effective 
assistance in any given case.” Id. Review must also “eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight” and “evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at 
the time,” rather than second-guessing counsel’s performance after it has 
proven unsuccessful. Id.  
 Reasonableness of counsel’s performance does not turn on a binary 
consideration of whether counsel’s actions were strategic, Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000), or whether a forgone objection may have succeeded, 
see  Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (counsel is not required “to 
pursue every claim or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic 
chance for success”); accord Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ¶45, 293 P.3d 345 
(“[A]ppellate counsel’s failure to raise an obvious, meritorious claim does not 
automatically render his assistance ineffective.”). Even a legal miscalculation 
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does not prove deficient performance. “The Sixth Amendment guarantees 
reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of 
hindsight.”  Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam). There is 
“no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or 
tactician.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 110. 
 The point of the Strickland analysis is to ensure a fair trial, not to “grade 
counsel’s performance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, or to weigh the relative 
merits of alternative strategies, State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶¶41-43, 328 P.3d 
841, abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016. 
The dispositive inquiry is simply whether counsel’s performance “fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see 
Bullock v. Carver, 29 F.3d 1036, 1045–51 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 In short, Buttars cannot prove deficient performance unless he proves 
that “no competent attorney” would have proceeded as his counsel did.  
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011); see Richter, 562 U.S. at 105, 110 (the 
Sixth Amendment requires “only a reasonably competent attorney” and 
defendant must prove that counsel’s performance “amounted to 
incompetence”). 
  On the prejudice element, Buttars must show “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
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proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This 
requires much more than merely showing that the errors “had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome” of the case. Id. at 693. And the “likelihood 
of a different result must be substantial.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.  
 Proving both deficient performance and prejudice requires actual 
proof—neither can be “a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable 
reality.” State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30, 253 P.3d 1082 (cleaned up). “It 
should go without saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the 
strong presumption that counsel” rendered “reasonable professional 
assistance.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 23 (2013) (cleaned up). Thus, any 
record gaps are construed in favor of finding both that counsel performed 
adequately, and that the defendant suffered no prejudice. State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, ¶17, 12 P.3d 92. 
A. Counsel was not ineffective when he did not object to the 
accurate summaries of bank records. 
 Buttars contends that his counsel was ineffective because he did not 
object to the admissibility of the summaries of bank records under rule 1006, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. He contends they were erroneous because they were 
compiled in reliance on extraneous information, they summarized 
information that does not qualify as “writings, recordings, or photographs,” 
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and they include conclusions and inferences. Aplt.Br.42–49. Buttars has not 
proven deficient performance or prejudice. 
 Rule 1006 permits a party to “use a summary, chart, or calculation to 
prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that 
cannot be conveniently examined in court.” Utah R. Evid. 1006. This is an 
exception to the so-called “best evidence rule,” which typically requires the 
“original writing, recording, or photograph…to prove its content.” Id. at 1002; 
see Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB & G Eng'g, Inc., 2013 UT App 146, ¶19, 305 P.3d 
171. To be admissible, “the proponent of a summary must provide a 
competent witness to establish the necessary foundation for the summary 
and the underlying records.” Sunridge, 2013 UT App 146, ¶20. 
 The bank summaries were prepared by the prosecutor’s expert John 
Curtis. He testified that he received bank records and other case files “to 
analyze the transactions related to some of the allegations in the case, and 
form opinions.” R3005–06. Curtis prepared seven “fair and accurate 
summar[ies] of all those bank records.” R3009–10. Defense counsel did not 
perform deficiently when he did not object to the admission of the summaries 
under rule 1006.4  
                                              
4 Defense counsel did more than not object. She explicitly stated, “we’re 
not arguing that summaries are inappropriate under 1006.” R2999. 
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 First, Buttars claims that counsel should have objected because the 
summaries were compiled “based on sources extraneous to the bank record 
data.”Aplt.Br.43–44. Reasonable counsel could have believed otherwise. 
 Curtis testified that he occasionally needed to find out who a payee 
was when the bank records were not clear, or otherwise needed background 
information to understand the flow of money through the accounts, and that 
he added this missing information in the summaries in brackets. 
R3015,3730,5183,6118,6125. For example, the bank record had a payment to 
“US PTO” that Cutis discovered was to the US Patent Trademark Office and 
stated as much in the summary. R6125; see State’sTr.Ex.26 at 2. In other 
instances, a payee was listed only as an address and Curtis would find out 
what business was located at that address and include it in the summary. 
R3015; see, e.g., State’sTr.Ex.26 at 4–5 (“[The Home Depot]” and “[GNC]”). 
Curtis also noted transfers from business to personal accounts or identified 
investor money with brackets. See State’sTr.Ex.26 at 7. 
 This information that Buttars claims his counsel was incompetent for 
not objecting to did nothing more than “prove the content” of the records by 
explaining the transactions. Utah R. Evid. 1006. Buttars does not allege that 
this information is inaccurate. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest 
that it was. And Curtis was careful to explain his methods to the jury. Buttars 
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cites no authority to show that this type of accurate information, when 
missing from bank records, violates rule 1006. Nor has Buttars explained why 
all reasonably competent counsel would have objected to this accurate 
information about the transactions in the bank records that was not in dispute 
and that was presented in a non-misleading way. Certainly, a reasonable 
attorney could have believed that an objection was futile. See Ring, 2018 UT 
19, ¶43 (holding counsel not ineffective because “trial counsel could have 
reasonably believed that an objection was futile”). And a competent attorney 
could also decide not to make an objection, even if potentially meritorious, 
because he was focused on other possibly stronger challenges, see Mirzayance, 
556 U.S. at 123; Ross, 2012 UT 93, ¶45, especially if an objection would be 
unlikely to materially affect the outcome, see discussion of prejudice, infra. 
 Second, Buttars similarly argues that the compilation of “questionable 
payments” identified on the summary cover sheets were made based on 
Curtis’ review of the facts of the case, which is beyond the underlying records 
themselves. Aplt.Br.44. But these payments were all included in the bank 
records. Compiling them merely constituted a “calculation” to prove the 
content of the records. Utah R. Evid. 1006. Buttars does not contend that the 
calculations are inaccurate. A competent attorney could reasonably decide 
not to object to these calculations. 
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 Third, Buttars argues that counsel should have objected because the 
summaries included “State-drawn” conclusions that some payments were 
“questionable” and that Buttars “commingled” funds. Aplt.Br.44. These 
conclusions were discussed in Curtis’ testimony. R5179–81,5259. Curtis 
explained, and the bank records themselves show, that investor money was 
transferred between business and personal accounts, and that the money was 
often spent on items that he deemed “questionable” business expenses. But 
Curtis was clear to testify that expenses he labeled as “questionable” could 
be legitimate. R5179–80. He also labeled some expenses as “potential 
legitimate payments,” thereby giving Buttars favorable evidence as well. A 
reasonable attorney could refrain from objecting to these conclusions that 
came in through Curtis’ testimony as well.  
 In fact, defense counsel used the categorization to Buttars’ advantage 
throughout the trial to challenge Curtis’ testimony by showing that Curtis 
did not know what the allegedly “questionable” payments were for, but that 
they could be for legitimate business expenses. In his opening statement, 
defense counsel highlighted the fact that the summaries merely said 
“questionable payments” but “[n]ot illegitimate, not illicit” payments. And 
that “the reason that this says ‘questionable’ is that Mr. Curtis will not 
necessarily know what the business purpose was behind these purchases.” 
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R4816–17. During cross-examination, defense counsel got Curtis to admit 
repeatedly that he did not know what the money was spent on and the 
payments could be legitimate business expenses, R5232–58, which counsel 
emphasized during closing arguments, R5620–21,5627–31,5637. Choosing not 
to object was a reasonable way to highlight Curtis’ ignorance of the actual use 
of funds and attack the State’s case. See State v. Bedell, 2014 UT 1, ¶¶23–25, 322 
P.3d 697.  
 Buttars was also not prejudiced. First, as stated, Buttars does not argue, 
let alone cite any record evidence showing, that anything in the summaries is 
inaccurate. Had counsel objected to the bracketed information it is not 
reasonably likely that the trial court would have removed it. And even if it 
were removed, Curtis could have and did provide testimony explaining the 
same information. It is not reasonably likely that even if the trial court 
removed this information from the summaries that it would have changed 
the outcome. 
 Second, including inferences such as “commingling” and 
“questionable” in the summaries was not reasonably likely to change the 
result. Again, the evidence came in through Curtis’ testimony. Removing the 
words from the summaries would not have changed the evidentiary picture. 
And Curtis admitted that payments he labeled as “questionable” could have 
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been legitimate. Labeling them as questionable only served to highlight for 
the jury which expenses were at issue but left it to the jury to decide whether 
Buttars’ actions amounted to securities fraud. That is the purpose of rule 1006, 
to make complex and voluminous records easier to understand. Moreover, 
such inferences were obvious ones that a reasonable jury would make on its 
own—using investor money on groceries, gas stations, and house cleaning is 
certainly “questionable.” Labeling them as such was not prejudicial. 
 Courts have found similar inferences contained in rule 1006 summaries 
to be harmless. In United States v. Spalding, 894 F.3d 173, 185–86 (5th Cir. 2018), 
a forensic accountant included in his summaries of bank records “inferences 
and opinions about the underlying records” that money was used for 
“personal expenses.” The court first stated that it had “upheld the admission 
of similar summary exhibits.” Id. at 186 (citing cases). But it did not decide 
whether there was error, because it held “any error was harmless” where “the 
exhibit does not suggest any conclusions unsupported by the evidence, the 
district court properly instructs the jury, and the defendant conducts a full 
cross-examination of the charts’ author.” Id. (cleaned up). 
 Here, the inferences were amply supported by the evidence—both the 
records themselves and Curtis’ testimony—showing how the money was 
transferred between business and personal accounts and where the money 
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was spent. And they were only opinions, which included Curtis’ concessions 
that the use of funds could have been legitimate. The jury was instructed that 
it did “not have to accept an expert’s opinion” and could give it “whatever 
weight you think it deserves.” R1391. Finally, Curtis was thoroughly cross-
examined about the summaries.  
 In sum, reasonable counsel could have elected not to object to the 
summaries of bank records and doing so did not prejudice Buttars. 
B. Counsel was not ineffective for proposing a jury 
instruction that was supported by existing case law.  
 Buttars argues that his counsel was deficient for proposing jury 
instruction 42 stating that knowledge of the falsity of material misstatements 
or omissions “can be inferred if the defendant consciously avoided the 
existence of a fact or facts,” and that Buttars “must have acted with the 
conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts.” Aplt.Br.52; see 
R1413. Buttars acknowledges that this Court approved this language in State 
v. Moore, 2015 UT App 112, ¶17, 349 P.3d 797. Aplt.Br.55. That alone defeats 
his ineffectiveness claim. 
 When reviewing an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
reviewing court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged 
conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s 
conduct” and “from counsel’s perspective.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90. 
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This includes assessing counsel’s conduct “on the basis of the law in effect at 
the time of trial.” State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). Buttars 
cannot prove that counsel was objectively unreasonable for relying on 
binding precedent. Nor can he show prejudice for including language 
approved by this Court. 
 Moore challenged jury instructions defining “willfully” in his 
securities fraud case, arguing that it omitted language approved of by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). Moore, 2015 
UT App 112, ¶16. The Court in Moore stated that “Larsen requires that Moore’s 
fraud convictions rest on facts indicating, for example, that he ‘made willful 
misstatements or omissions of a material fact’ by having ‘consciously avoided 
the existence of a fact or facts’ or, in other words, that Moore ‘acted with a 
conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts.” Id. ¶17 
(quoting State v. Chapman, 2014 UT App 255, ¶11, 338 P.3d 230). Thus, the 
language Buttars challenges was approved of in Moore based on the supreme 
court’s holding in Larsen. Moreover, it is the same language used in a jury 
instruction in Chapman that was not challenged. Chapman, 2014 UT App 255, 
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¶11. Thus, reasonable counsel could read Larsen, Moore, and Chapman and be 
satisfied that this language was correct.5  
 Buttars argues that the language in Moore is “non-binding dicta.” Even 
if it were, he has not shown that it was objectively unreasonable to rely on 
this Court’s approval of specific language, even if it were dicta. Buttars also 
argues that if the language is not dicta, that the Court should overrule it. The 
Court need not reach this issue. The question here is whether counsel was 
                                              
5 Buttars suggests that if Moore “precludes a showing of deficient 
performance,” the Court could reach the issue “under the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine.” Aplt.Br.57–58. This argument is inadequately 
briefed and fails to meet his burden of persuasion. 
The exceptional circumstances doctrine is reserved for “the most 
unusual circumstances” where a “rare procedural anomaly” prevents or 
excuses preserving the issue. State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶29, 416 P.3d 443 
(cleaned up). Buttars barely analyzes this doctrine in two paragraphs. And 
he fails to show how counsel’s reliance on existing law qualifies as the type 
of “rare procedural anomaly” that the exceptional circumstances exception is 
intended to reach, especially where the court can review the issue under his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶¶29–38 
(exceptional circumstances “is not a catch-all category that may be used to do 
the work of other exceptions” to preservation).  
 In addition, Buttars misquotes exceptional circumstances case law to 
suggest that if “the settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have 
raised an issue,” it could create exceptional circumstances. Aplt.Br.57–58 
(quoting State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). But this Court in 
Irwin said that “a change in the law or the settled interpretation of law” could 
create exceptional circumstances. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8 (emphasis added). 
Buttars has not identified any change in the law that prevented preservation. 
He merely disputes this Court’s statements about the law. 
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ineffective for relying on language from this Court’s opinion at the time. 
Overruling that language now would not change the analysis.  
 Counsel was also not deficient because jury instructions “must be read 
together as a whole,” State v. Lambdin, 2017 UT 46, ¶50, 424 P.3d 117, and 
reasonable counsel could have decided that Instruction 42, when read with 
the other instructions defining willfully, correctly informed the jury about the 
mental state. Three separate instructions, including Instruction 42, explained 
that a person acts “willfully” if he has the “conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result.” R1412–13,1424. Buttars does not 
challenge this definition as it correctly states the law. See Utah Code Ann. §76-
2-103(1). 
 Instruction 42 does not contradict that general definition. But it added 
three important clarifications that the other instructions did not. First, it 
emphasized that a person “acts willfully if he acts purposefully and not 
because of mistake or accident.” See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 n.3 (“To act 
willfully in this context means to act deliberately and purposefully, as 
distinguished from merely accidentally or inadvertently.”). Second, it 
explained willfulness in a securities fraud context, stressing that a person 
must have “knowledge” about the falsity of a misstatement, the omitted facts, 
and the materiality of them. See State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, ¶12 n.5, 
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14 P.3d 114 (intentional mental states “require actual knowledge”). Third, it 
tied the knowledge back to willfulness by stating that Buttars could not be 
convicted “if he was merely negligent, careless or foolish,” rather, his 
knowledge could be inferred only by willful conduct—“a conscious objective 
or desire to ignore a material fact or facts.” See Moore, 2015 UT App 112, ¶17. 
Reasonable counsel could include this instruction with the others as part of 
the totality of the instructions on willfulness because it provides further 
guidance to help the jury understand the mental state. 
 Buttars argues that this instruction amounted to an instruction of 
“willful blindness” that the Moore Court rejected. But the instruction in Moore 
was problematic because it imposed an affirmative duty to know and 
imposed criminal liability for an individual who “recklessly state[s] facts 
about matters of which he is ignorant.” Id. ¶¶9–10. The instruction here 
includes neither of those issues. Instead, it tracks the language approved of 
in Moore, which was intended to eliminate liability for “good faith oversight” 
or the “failure to discover and disclose a material fact.” See id. ¶17 (cleaned 
up). Again, counsel cannot be found to be ineffective where case law at the 
time supports his course of conduct. 
 Buttars also has not shown that he was prejudiced. The instruction was 
consistent with binding case law. And even if there were some error, it was 
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not material to this case. The jury was not tasked with deciding whether 
Buttars consciously avoided or ignored material facts. The jury was presented 
with evidence that Buttars—the CEO of Ellipse and MovieBlitz who managed 
the companies’ finances, and who was “over everything,” R4859–60, 
4910,4954,5028–29,5033—made untrue statements and had actual knowledge 
of material facts that he did not tell investors in order to make what he did 
tell them not misleading. This included telling them about MovieBlitz’s 
investment opportunity without telling them the same investment 
opportunity under a different name had failed; telling them about 
MovieBlitz’s patented technology without telling them that Ellipse had a 
claim on those patents; telling them that their money would be used to 
develop the technology and bring it to market, without telling them that the 
money would be used for groceries, mortgage payments, house cleaning, 
private investigators, and other personal expenses, or that the companies 
were undercapitalized. Omitting these material facts made the facts he did 
tell them misleading and constituted securities fraud.  
 In addition, the jury had significant evidence that Buttars willfully 
engaged in an act, practice or course of business which operated or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(3). 
Buttars engaged in an extensive practice over several years of selling 
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securities under the guise of developing a product and then immediately 
spending the money on personal expenses. And he continued that practice 
even after the first company failed because it ran out of money. No reasonable 
jury would believe that this conduct, which is unaffected by the alleged error, 
did not constitute securities fraud. 
 Buttars has failed to show either element of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for proposing Instruction 42.  
C. Counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to expert 
testimony, argument, and jury instruction about material 
omissions. 
 Buttars claims that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to 
expert testimony by Brian Lloyd and prosecutorial argument that allegedly 
misstated the law about making omissions of material facts. Aplt.Br.60–66. 
Buttars asserts that counsel preserved a similar argument with a general 
objection to Instruction 47, but that if the issue is unpreserved, counsel was 
ineffective for not making a proper objection. Aplt.Br.63–64. The challenge to 
Instruction 47 is unpreserved and Buttars has not proved ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
1. Counsel’s general objection to Instruction 47 did not 
preserve this specific issue. 
 Instruction 47 states that a defendant’s “honest belief that an event 
would occur in the future” or “good faith effort to bring about the future 
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event” does not permit him “to make a willful misrepresentation or omission 
of material fact.” R1419. Buttars argues that Instruction 47 erroneously 
instructs the jury that he has an affirmative duty not to omit material facts. 
He claims that his counsel’s objection to Instruction 47 preserved this issue. 
Aplt.Br.62–63. It did not. Counsel made only a general objection to 
Instruction 47, which is insufficient to preserve the specific issue he raises on 
appeal. 
 “As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶11, 10 P.3d 346. To preserve 
a claim for appellate review, “[t]he issue must be raised to a level of 
consciousness that allows the trial court an adequate opportunity to address 
it.” State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶16, 164 P.3d 397 (cleaned up). A defendant 
must therefore make “a timely and specific objection…to preserve an issue for 
appeal.” State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶17, 192 P.3d 867 (cleaned up). 
 Counsel and the court went over the jury instructions in chambers, off 
the record. R5573. When given the opportunity to make objections on the 
record, defense counsel objected to Instruction 47 but did not give a reason. 
R5574–76. Buttars concedes that counsel did not “lodge a specific objection 
on the record.” Aplt.Br.64.  
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 In addition, the State’s argument in favor of the instruction does not 
indicate that the objection was related to the portion of the instruction about 
material omissions. See R5575. Nor did the trial court’s ruling. R5575–76. 
Without a specific objection upon which the trial court could make a specific 
ruling, this issue is unpreserved. 
2. Counsel’s performance was neither deficient nor 
prejudicial. 
 Buttars identifies three instances where he alleges that the law 
regarding material omissions was misstated during trial without objection 
from counsel. He identifies selective portions of the testimony of securities 
expert Brian Lloyd; a single line from the prosecutor’s closing argument; and 
a phrase in Instruction 47. Each of these, he claims, misstated the law 
regarding Buttar’s obligation not to make material omissions in connection 
with the sale of securities by “suggest[ing] that the law imposed an 
affirmative duty to disclose material information—even in the absence of a 
prior misleading statement.” Aplt.Br.61. Buttars fails to show either deficient 
performance or prejudice. 
 Buttars was charged with violating the Utah Uniform Securities Act, 
which makes it unlawful to (1) “make any untrue statement of a material fact” 
or (2) “omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
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made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading” in the sale of securities. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2).  
 Buttars appears to take issue with the fact that every time Lloyd, the 
prosecutor, or the instructions spoke about omissions they did not say 
“necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.” But a reasonable 
attorney could decide not to object every time a person or an instruction used 
an abbreviated “material misstatements and omissions,” or stating that a 
seller may not “omit material information.” Even the case law routinely uses 
simplified short-hand to refer to the statute’s disclosure obligations. See, e.g., 
Fibro Tr., Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, ¶14, 974 P.2d 288 (“[A] person 
violates section 61–1–1(2) only if that person willfully misstates or omits 
material facts.”); Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 (“The plain language” requires a 
finding that defendant “acted ‘willfully’ in misstating or omitting material 
facts.”); id. at 1358 n.3 (“willful” in securities fraud context “implies a 
willingness to commit the act, which, in this case, is the misstatement or 
omission of a material fact”); id. at 1361 (“[T]he statute prohibit[s] material 
omissions or misstatements.”); Chapman, 2014 UT App 255, ¶13 (discussing 
evidence of defendant’s “several willful material misstatements or omissions 
of material fact”). 
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 The reasonableness of counsel’s decision not to object is solidified here, 
where the jury instructions and the record as a whole made clear that there is 
no affirmative duty to disclose all material facts, rather, any omitted 
information must be necessary to make the statements that were made not 
misleading. 
 First, six separate jury instructions, including four securities fraud 
elements instructions, informed the jury that omissions must be “necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading.” R1403,1405,1407,1409 (elements 
instructions), 1416 (defining “fraud”), 1418 (referring to charges/elements). 
 Second, Lloyd repeatedly stated that the omissions must be about 
information “necessary” to make other statements not misleading, even 
though he occasionally used a short-hand version. For example, he stated, 
“fraud is considered when you have a misstatement of material information, 
or the omission of material information necessary to address a misstatement 
or a deceit.” R4827; see also R4826–27 (a seller may not “omit information 
that’s necessary in order to understand material fact.”); R4832 (sellers are “not 
to omit information that is necessary to correct a misstatement”). When asked 
specifically whether a seller is “required to disclose all material information,” 
he did not agree with that interpretation. Rather, Lloyd responded that a 
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seller cannot “omit to provide material information that’s necessary to correct 
a misstatement.” R4831. Thus, Lloyd repeatedly focused omissions on 
whether they were necessary in light of other misleading statements. 
 Third, the prosecutor, after discussing disclosure obligations, referred 
the jury to the law “contained in the jury instructions,” which, again set out 
the proper standard regarding omissions. R5611. 
 Reasonable counsel could be satisfied that these statements were 
adequate even if they did not perfectly quote the statute, especially “in light 
of all of the circumstances,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  
 Instruction 47 used similar short-hand language to that used in case 
law identified above. R1419. Moreover, its purpose was not to define the 
elements of the crime, but to explain that a person may not hide behind an 
honest belief or good faith efforts to excuse the making of material 
misstatements or omissions. Buttars argues that such belief could be a 
defense, making this instruction erroneous. Aplt.Br. 62–63. It is not, at least 
when the jury finds the Buttars made willful misrepresentations or omissions. 
“Because a finding of scienter is not a prerequisite to criminal liability under 
section 61–1–1(2), the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that 
good faith is a complete defense to criminal liability.” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360 
n.8. Competent counsel could reasonably conclude that there was no reason 
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to object to Instruction 47’s use of the common abbreviation “material 
misstatements or omissions.” 
 Buttars has also not proven prejudice. As explained above, the jury was 
correctly instructed on the elements of securities fraud, which required a 
finding that any omissions must have been of “a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading.” R1403,1405,1407,1409,1416,1418; see Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-1(2). The jury was further instructed that the judge would 
“instruct [them] on the law.” R1377. Using the short-hand “material 
misstatements or omissions” did not change what that jury had to find in 
order to convict. It is not reasonably likely that the jury would have 
misunderstood that the references to “material misstatements or omissions” 
was anything other than an abbreviated way to speak clearly about the real 
standard spelled out clearly and repeatedly in the instructions. 
 In addition, the evidence revolved around specific material facts that 
were not said to investors but were necessary to make the statements Buttars 
did make, not misleading. The evidence focused on several of these types of 
omissions. For example, Buttars told investors (1) that MovieBlitz was a 
startup company developing a new movie-renting technology; (2) that 
MovieBlitz had patents for this new technology; (3) that investor money 
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would be used to develop the technology; and (4) that the company was in 
great shape. However, in order to make these statements not misleading, 
Buttars needed to also tell them, but did not, (1) that MovieBlitz was the 
second such startup company, the first of which failed to develop the 
technology after several years despite hundreds of thousands of investor 
dollars; (2) that the patents were encumbered because the prior company also 
had a claim on them; (3) that investor money would be used for things other 
than developing the technology, including paying off old debt (personal and 
business), groceries, house cleaning, and other personal expenses; and (4) that 
the first business had failed and that both businesses did not have sufficient 
capital to operate. By omitting to state these material facts, the statements 
Buttars did make were misleading. 
 Moreover, the case was not built merely on omissions. Even if the jury 
thought it could convict based on a duty to disclose, despite there being no 
instruction to that effect, it is not reasonably likely that the jury did not also 
find Buttars guilty for the several untrue statements he made. This included 
statements about the use of funds to develop the technology. Other than 
incorporating MovieBlitz in Nevada, the majority of investor funds were 
spent on things that cannot be reasonably construed as developing the 
technology. Just “one [untrue] statement [of material fact] is alone sufficient 
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to satisfy the elements of the statute.” State v Schwenke, 2009 UT App 345, ¶15, 
222 P.3d 768. And as the trial court found, “[t]he jury heard testimony and 
saw evidence that the defendant willfully made numerous untrue statements 
and omissions of material facts.” R2579 (emphasis added). 
 Buttars suggests that without the alleged misstatements on the law the 
jury could have acquitted for three reasons, none of which are availing. First, 
Buttars argues that the jury could have concluded that he believed all that he 
said. There is no basis in the evidence to conclude that Buttars believed 
everything he said. As CEO and the person in charge of financials, Buttars 
knew the financial affairs of the companies, he knew how he was spending 
investor funds, he knew about the patents dispute, and he knew that Ellipse 
failed. He lied about or omitted to tell investors these material facts. 
 Second, Buttars claims a jury could believe he was unaware of 
misleading predicate statements made by others. But the evidence was not 
about what other people did or did not tell investors. It was about what 
Buttars did or did not tell investors. And, as the trial court found, there was 
a “vast amount of evidence of untrue material statements and omissions 
made by defendant.” R2579–80 (emphasis added). 
 Third, Buttars claims that the jury could believe that he did not misuse 
funds because they could have been used for business expenses. But the 
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investors were not told that their investment would simply be placed into a 
business account to be used for any business purpose. They were specifically 
told that it would be used to develop the technology and bring it to market. 
And even if some of the funds could be viewed as being spent on appropriate 
business expenses, there is no way all of them could be. A reasonable investor 
would want to know whether his $10,000 investment—which he was told 
would go directly to developing the technology—was actually being used on 
dining at restaurants, groceries, gas, a house cleaner, a private investigator, 
child support, or past debts—none of which is going to develop the product 
or increase the likelihood of the investment paying off. 
 Finally, any error would not have created a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury would not have also convicted under subpart three of the securities 
fraud statute for “engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.” Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-1(3). Buttars’ course of business over several years of obtaining 
investor money for developing a new technology but using those funds on 
personal expenses is a fraud or deceit upon those investors. Buttars does not 
show that any error in counsel’s performance would have affected the jury’s 
decision to convict under this prong of the statute. 
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III. 
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It 
Admitted Expert Testimony. 
 Buttars challenges the trial court’s admission of expert testimony from 
Brian Lloyd and John Curtis. Aplt.Br.66–75. A trial court has “wide discretion 
in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. An 
appellate court “will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of 
reasonability.” Id. The trial court here did not abuse its discretion when it 
admitted both testimonies. 
 Rules 702 and 704, Utah Rules of Evidence, govern the admissibility of 
expert testimony. Rule 702 provides that an expert “may testify in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise” if the expert’s specialized knowledge “will help 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 
Utah R. Evid. 702(a). Rule 704 provides that an “opinion is not objectionable 
just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Id. at 704(a).  
 Under these rules, expert “opinions that tell the jury what result to 
reach or give legal conclusions [are] impermissible.” State v. Davis, 2007 UT 
App 13, ¶15, 155 P.3d 909 (cleaned up). This is because such testimony 
“tend[s] to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, 
and witness.” Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, “there is a danger that a juror may 
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turn to the [witness’s legal conclusion] rather than the judge for guidance on 
the applicable law.” Id. (cleaned up).  
 At the same time, however, experts may properly testify as to the reach 
of legal terms if it “aid[s] the jury in resolving the factual disputes” at hand. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361 n.11. For example, “expert testimony may be 
appropriate in securities fraud cases because the technical nature of securities 
is not within the knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the 
common experience and would help the jury understand the issues before 
them.” Id. at 1361 (cleaned up). Indeed, such expert testimony can be 
particularly helpful when experts, “because of particular knowledge[,] are 
competent to reach an intelligent conclusion and inexperienced persons are 
likely to prove incapable of forming a correct judgment without skilled 
assistance.” Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ¶22, 977 P.2d 1193. 
 Consequently, “[n]o ‘bright line’ separates permissible ultimate issue 
testimony under rule 704 and impermissible ‘overbroad legal responses’ a 
witness may give during questioning.” Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶16. Thus, a 
“semantic characterization of [an expert’s] testimony as a legal conclusion 
does not, without more, move the testimony outside the scope of” rule 704. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1362.  
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 Utah courts have found expert testimony improper only when the 
expert expressly opines on whether the defendant’s conduct violated the law. 
See Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶¶14-17 (expert testimony that defendant 
“possessed” firearm under the “statute” improper); State v. Stringham, 957 
P.2d 602, 607 (Utah App. 1998) (expert’s opinion that hypothetical conduct 
that was identical to defendant’s alleged crime was “illegal” was reversible 
error); State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996) (error when experts 
“tie[d] their opinions to the requirements of Utah law”); Cf. Larsen, 865 P.2d 
at 1361–63 & n.10 (testimony was proper because expert “did not…testify that 
Larsen was guilty” or “that, as a matter of law, the facts satisfied the legal 
standard of materiality”). 
 Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
testimony of Lloyd and Curtis under rule 704 because neither opined as to 
whether Buttars’ conduct violated Utah law or met the legal standard for 
securities fraud. 
A. Lloyd’s testimony was properly admitted. 
 Buttars claims that Lloyd improperly defined “material” and provided 
“examples of material information [that] mirrored the State’s allegations.” 
Aplt.Br.68–70. Lloyd twice defined “material” in the securities context: (1) 
“information that a reasonable investor would consider important in making 
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a decision whether to purchase or to sell a security,” R4830; and (2) 
“information that’s important to an investor making a decision,” R4838. And 
he gave general examples of material information “in the securities industry,” 
including information about the business, its assets, management, financial 
information, and risks. R4838–39. The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by allowing this testimony. 
 In Larsen, the supreme court found no error in an expert opining “that 
some of the material that Larson had omitted from the securities documents 
could have been important or significant to an investor,” where the expert 
did not “testify that Larsen was guilty” or “that, as a matter of law, the facts 
satisfied the legal standard of materiality.” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361 & n.10. 
The court held that “Rule 704 permits [an expert] to express an opinion 
regarding the ultimate resolution of that disputed issue”—whether misstated 
or omitted facts are material. Id. at 1363. 
 Similarly, in State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1153-55 & n.9 (Utah App. 
1994), this Court upheld the admission of “expert testimony concerning the 
materiality of certain misrepresentations and omissions Harry allegedly 
made or failed to make.” The Harry court also held that the expert’s testimony 
“that selling away is illegal” was not improper where the “expert did not 
testify that Harry actually sold away.” Id.  
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 Lloyd did even less than the experts in Larsen and Harry. Those experts 
explicitly opined that the defendants misrepresented or omitted material 
information, but Lloyd merely gave examples of material information 
without drawing the conclusion that Buttars had misstated or omitted such 
information. And even if he had, he would have done no more than what was 
allowed in Larsen and Harry. Lloyd “did not testify…that [Buttars] was 
guilty,” or that “as a matter of law, the facts satisfied the legal standard of 
materiality.” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361 & n.10. He was asked and he answered 
questions about examples of material information in the context of the 
“securities industry,” R4838–39, not “under Utah law” or “under the Act,” see 
Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756. 
 Lloyd’s testimony was very similar to that approved of in Chapman, 
2014 UT App 255, ¶21. The expert did not state what information was 
“required” to be disclosed, but rather, gave “‘some examples’ of information 
that he believed is important” to consider when purchasing a security. Id. 
That is precisely what Lloyd did. 
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 Lloyd’s testimony stayed within the bounds of rule 704 as approved by 
both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting his testimony.6 
B. Curtis’ testimony was properly admitted. 
 Buttars challenges Curtis’ testimony where he offered examples of 
“characteristics of fraud.” Aplt.Br.70–72. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting this testimony because, like Lloyd, Curtis also 
refrained from offering an opinion about the requirements of Utah law or the 
securities statutes. 
 The bulk of Curtis’ testimony was about his review and summary of 
the bank records. At the end of his direct examination Curtis testified of 
“general” “characteristics” that he looks for in his “practice” when analyzing 
possible fraud, including misrepresentations, disregard of corporate 
formalities, dependency on investor money, misuse of funds, and 
                                              
6 Buttars’ passing argument that the trial court did not consider 
helpfulness under rule 702 is unpreserved and inadequately briefed. 
Aplt.Br.69–70. Lloyd was the first witness on day one of trial, but Buttars did 
not raise a helpfulness objection until during the last witness on day two. The 
untimeliness of the objection failed to preserve this claim. See Low, 2008 UT 
58, ¶17 (an objection must be “timely” to preserve an issue for appeal). 
Moreover, the trial court ruled that Lloyd’s testimony would be helpful, 
consistent with case law. R5225–26. Buttars does not even acknowledge the 
trial court’s ruling let alone show it was erroneous in his meager one-
paragraph argument. 
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undercapitalization. R5227–28. He also testified that he had seen some of 
those characteristics in this case. R5228.  
 The trial court allowed the testimony “so long as the questioning and 
the answers do not touch on…the ultimate question under Utah law, or under 
the statutes…as to what is fraudulent, what is securities fraud.” R5224. 
Curtis’ testimony followed those limitations. While Curtis did speak about 
“fraud,” it was “based on generally accepted accounting practices…and 
principles,” not on Utah law. R5228. His testimony did not include the 
impermissible conclusory testimony that Buttars was guilty of the crimes 
charged. He did not mention the legal standard or discuss Utah statutes. Nor 
did he testify that Buttars was responsible for any of the characteristics or that 
Buttars acted willfully. His testimony was properly admitted, pursuant to the 
trial court’s discretion.7   
C. Buttars was not prejudiced by any error in admitting the expert 
testimony. 
 Even when an expert’s testimony exceeds permissible limits, the 
defendant must show that he was prejudiced by it. See Tenney, 913 P.2d at 
                                              
7 Buttars briefly claims that the trial court did not sufficiently analyze 
the testimony’s helpfulness under rule 702 or its prejudicial effect under rule 
403. Aplt.Br.72–73. Buttars did not make a rule 403 objection below and thus 
failed to preserve that issue. Moreover, Buttars’ single paragraph, which fails 
to analyze the trial court’s ruling on helpfulness, is inadequately briefed. 
-86- 
756; Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Such testimony is not prejudicial if it “matche[s] 
the [law] set forth in the jury instruction[s].” State v. LaCount, 732 N.W.2d 29, 
35-36 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007); accord People v. Prendergast, 87 P.3d 175, 183 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2003); People v. Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (App. Div. 1998). Nor is it 
prejudicial if the trial court “correctly admonishe[s] the jury as to the relative 
roles of expert testimony and opinion evidence,” “instruct[s] the jury to 
accord no unusual deference to an expert’s opinions,” and gives “careful 
instructions regarding the legal definition[s] and requirements of the 
term[s]…as used in the [governing] statute.” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1363.  
 The admission of Lloyd’s and Curtis’ testimony was not prejudicial for 
these reasons. Lloyd’s definition of material was similar to the definition 
included in the jury instructions. Compare R4830 (“information that a 
reasonable investor would consider important in making a decision whether 
to purchase or to sell a security”) with R1416 (“A ‘Material fact’ is something 
which a buyer of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of 
importance in determining whether to buy a security.”) Buttars does not 
contend that Lloyd misstated the law. Thus, there can be no harm if the jury 
followed Lloyd’s definition of materiality that was consistent with the jury 
instructions. See Chapman, 2014 UT App 255, ¶¶38–39 (Pearce, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the result in part). 
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 The jury was also instructed to weigh the opinion of an expert and 
judge its “overall credibility.” But that it did “not have to accept an expert’s 
opinion,” that it could “accept it all, reject it all, or accept part and reject part,” 
and that it should “[g]ive it whatever weight you think it deserves.” R1391. 
And the jury was instructed about legal definitions and required elements 
under the law. R1403–11,1416–17,1425–26. 
 Courts assume that jurors “were conscientious in performing their 
duty, and that they followed the instructions of the court.” State v. Hodges, 
517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1974); accord State v. Lee, 2014 UT App 107, ¶25, 318 
P.3d 1164. And based on these correct instructions, it is not reasonably likely 
that absent the experts’ testimony, the jury would have reached a different 
result. Whatever error may have occurred, “[t]he jury was charged with 
making the ultimate determination of whether the statements made or facts 
omitted…were factually material” and whether Buttars willfully committed 
securities fraud. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1362. Buttars has failed to show he was 
prejudiced by any error. 
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IV. 
Buttars Has Not Proven Any Errors and Therefore Has Not 
Proven Cumulative Error. 
 Buttars argues that if no single error is independently sufficient to 
warrant reversal, he can prevail under the doctrine of cumulative error. 
Aplt.Br.75–76. Because there are no errors to accumulate, this claim fails. 
 Under the doctrine of cumulative error, courts “will reverse only if the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines the confidence…that a fair 
trial was had,” even if no error was sufficiently prejudicial alone. State v. 
Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ¶74, 125 P.3d 878. (quotation simplified). If, however, 
“the claims are found on appeal to not constitute error, or the errors are found 
to be so minor as to result in no harm, the doctrine will not be applied.” Id.; 
accord State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶42, 428 P.3d 1038. Finally, “a 
single accumulable error cannot warrant reversal under the cumulative error 
doctrine.” Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶48. 
 As described above, Buttars has failed to establish any error, let alone 
several errors. Accordingly, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the State asks this Court to affirm Buttars’ 
convictions. 
 Respectfully submitted on June 10, 2019. 
  SEAN D. REYES 
  Utah Attorney General 
 
/s/ Jeffrey D. Mann  
  JEFFREY D. MANN 
  Assistant Solicitor General 
  Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendurn A

utah Code Annotated s 61"-1,1" (West 2013) Fraud unlawful
It is unlawful for any persory in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of
any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ arry device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(Z) *ul" iny untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstan^es
under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

Utah Code Annotate d S 6L-1-21 (West 2018) Penalties for violations
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates:
(a) a provision of this chapter except Sections 6L-L-1 and 61'-'l'-'l'6;
(b) an order issued under this chapter; or
(c) Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made is false or misleading in a
material respect.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this sectiory a person who willfully
violates Section 61-1-L :
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony If, at the time the crime was committed, the
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was
worth less than $1"0,000; or
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if, at the time the crime was conunitted, the
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was
worth $10,000 or more.
(3) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1"-L is guilty of a second degree
felony if:
(u) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than $10,000; and
(b) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any money
representing:
(i) equity in a person's primary residence;
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement accoun!
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal
Revenue Codel;
(iv) an investment by a person over whom the violator exercises undue influence;
or
(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult.
(4) A person who willfully violates Section 6L-1-L is guilfy of a second degree
felony punishabte by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
three years or more than 15 years if:
(u) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; and
(b) i., connection with that violatiory the violator knowingly accepted any money
representing:
(i) equity in a person's primary residence;
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement accoun!
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal
Revenue Code;
(iv) an investment by a person over whom the violator exercises undue influence;
or
(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult.
(5) When amounts of property, moneyr or other things are unlawfully obtained
or sought to be obtained under a series of acts or continuing course of business,
whether from the same or several sources, the amounts may be aggregated in
determining the level of offense.
(6) It is an affirmative defense under this section against a claim that the person
violated an order issued under this chapter for the person to prove that the
person had no knowledge of the order.
(7) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter, the
sentencing judge may impose a penalty or remedy provided for in Subsection
61-1-20(2)(b).
utah code Annotate d, s76-2-103 (West 2018) Definitions
A person engages in conduct:
(ff Intentionatly, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint'
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surro,tnding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exiit or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that
an ord.inaiy p"rror, would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.

Utah Code AnnotatedSTT-22-2 (West 20L8) Investigations--Right to
subpoena witnesses and require production of evidence--Contents of
subpoena--Nghts of witnesses--Interrogation before closed
court--Dis closure of inforrnation
(1) As used in this sectiory "prosecutor" means the attorney general, county
attorney, district attorney, or municipal attorney.
(ZXu) In any matter involving the investigation of a crime or malfeasance in
office, or any criminal conspiracy or activity, the prosecutor may, upon
application and approval of the district court and for good cause showry conduct
a criminal investigation.
(b) The application and statement of good cause shall state whether or not any
other investigative order related to the investigation at issue has been filed in
another court.
(g)(u) Subject to the conditions established in Subsection (3)(b), the prosecutor
may:
(i) subpoena witnesses;
(ii) compel their attendance and testimony under oath to be recorded by a
suitable electronic recording device or to be given before any certified court
reporter; and
(iii) require the production of books, papers, documents, recordings, and any
other items that constitute evidence or may be relevant to the investigation.
(b) The prosecutor shall:
(i) apply to the district court for each subpoena; and
(ii) show that the requested information is reasonably related to the criminal
investigation authoized by the court.
(a)(u) The prosecutor shall state in each subpoenai
(i) the time and place of the examination;
(ii) that the subpoena is issued in aid of a criminal investigation; and
(iii) the right of the person subpoenaed to have counsel present.
(b) The examination may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdiction of the
prosecutor issuing the subpoena.
(c) The subpoena need not disclose the names of possible defendants.
(d) Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a civil action.
(S)(u) At the beginning of each compelled interrogatiory the prosecutor shall
personally inform each witness:
(i) of the general subject matter of the investigation;
(ii) of the privilege to, at any time during the proceeding, refuse to answer any
question or produce any evidence of a communicative nature that may result in
self-incrimination;
(iii) that any information provided may be used against the witness in a
subsequent criminal proceeding; and
(iv) of the right to have counsel present.
(b) If the prosecutor has substantial evidence that the subpoenaed wibress has
committed a crime that is under investigation, the prosecutor shall:
(i) inform the witness in person before interrogation of that witness's target
status; and
(ii) inform the wibress of the nature of the charges under consideration against
the witness.
(6)(a)(i) The prosecutor may make written application to any district court
showing a reasonable likelihood that publicly releasing information about the
identify of a witness or the substance of the evidence resulting from a subpoena
or interrogation would pose a threat of harm to a person or otherwise impede the
investigation.
(ii) upon a finding of reasonable likelihood, the court may order the:
(A) interrogation of a witness be held in secref
(B) occurrence of the interrogation and other subpoenaing of evidence, the
identity of the person subpoenaed, and the substance of the evidence obtained be
kept secref and
(C) record of testimony and other subpoenaed evidence be kept secret unless the
court for good cause otherwise orders.
(b) After applicatiory the court may by order exclude from any investigative
hearing or proceedirg any persons except:
(i) the attorneys representing the state and members of their staffs;
(ii) persons who, in the judgment of the attorneys representing the state, are
reasonably necessary to assist in the investigative process;
(iii) the court reporter or operator of the electronic recording d,evice; and
(iv) the attorney for the witness.
(c) This chapter does not prevent attorneys representing the state or members of
their staff from disclosing in-formation obtained pursuant to this chapter for the
purpose of furthering any official governmental investigation.
(dxi) If a secrecy order has been granted by the court regarding the interrogation
or disclosure of evidence by u witness under this subsectiory and if the court
finds a further restriction on the witness is appropriate, the court may order the
witness not to disclose the substance of the witness's testimony or evidence given
by the wibress to others.
(ii) Any order to not disclose made under this subsection shall be served with the
subpoena.
(iii) In an appropriate circumstance the court may order that the wibress not
disclose the existence of the investigation to others.
(iv) Any order under this Subsection (6)(d) must be based upon a finding by the
court that one or more of the following risks exist:
(A) disclosure by the witness would cause destruction of evidence;
(B) disclosure by the witness would taint the evidence provided by other
witnesses;
(C) disclosure by the witness to a target of the investigation would result in flight
or other conduct to avoid prosecution;
(D) disclosure by the witness would damage a person's reputation; or
(E) disclosure by the witness would cause a threat of harm to any person.
(")(i) If the court imposes an order under Subsection (6)(d) authorizing an
instruction to a witness not to disclose the substance of testimony or evidence
provided and the prosecuting agency proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that a witness has violated that order, the court may hold the witness in
contempt.
(ii) An order of secrecy imposed on a witness under this Subsection (6)(e) may
not infringe on the attorney-client relationship between the witness and the
wifi:ress's attorney or on any other legally recognized privileged relationship.
(Z)(a)(i) The prosecutor may submit to any district court a separate written
request that the application, statement of good cause, and the court's order
authorizing the investigation be kept secret.
(iil The request for secrecy is a public record under Title 63G, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act, but need not contain any
information that would compromise any of the interest listed in Subsection (7)(c).
(b) With the court's permission, the prosecutor may submit to the court, in
camera, any additional in-formation to support the request for secrecy if
necessary to avoid compromising the interests listed in Subsection (7)(c).
(.) The court shali consider all information in the application and order
authorizing the investigation and any information received in camera and shall
order that all inJormation be placed in the public file except information that, if
disclosed, would pose:
(i) a substantial risk of harm to a person's safety;
(ii) a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person's reputation or privacy;
or
(iii) a serious impediment to the investigation.
(d) Before granting an order keeping secret documents and other information
received under this sectiory the court shall narrow the secrecy order as much as
reasonably possible in order to preserve the openness of court records while
protecting the interests listed in Subsection (7)(c).

Utah R. Evid. 702. Testimony by Experts
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), u witness who is qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, trainin1r ot education may testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for
expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or
methods that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying
principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner
of tn"ir application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant
expert community.

Utah R. Evid. Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ul-
timate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an ele-
ment of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are mat-
ters for the trier of fact alone.

Utah R. Evid. Rule 803 Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immate-
rial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or
immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition mad.e
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotiory sensatiory or physical condition
(such as intent, plarv motive, design mental feeling, Pairu and bodily health), but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the executiory revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
puri ot present symptoms, pairy or sensations, or the inception or general char-
acter of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Record.ed recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about
which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to
enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to
reflect thai knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be
read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by
an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report/ record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11),
Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certificatiory unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, instifutiory as-
sociatiory profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not con-
ducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, rec-
ords, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of
Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the
matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, repor! record, or data compilation
was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations,
in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the of-
fice or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to
which matters there was a dtfy to repor! excluding, however, in criminal cases
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C)
in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births,
fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a pubtic office
pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or enhy. To prove the absence of a record, report,
statemenf or data compilatiory in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence
of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form,
was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the
form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent
search failed to disclose the record, report, statemen! or data compilatiory or en-
try.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces,
deaths,legitimac/, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar
facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a reli-
gious organization.
(L2) Marriage,baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in
a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or adminis-
tered a sacrament, made by a clergymary public official, or other person author-
ized.by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the
act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history
contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions
on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like'
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in propettyt as proof of the
content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each
person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a
public oflice and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of
that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property If
the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings
with the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the
truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations,
lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied uPon
by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
(18) Learned heatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness
upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examina-
tiory statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a
subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable au-
thority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony
or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but
may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among
members of a person's family by blood, adoptiory or marriage, or among a per-
son's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoptiory
marriage, divorce, death,legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoptiory or mar-
riage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affect-
ing lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history im-
portant to the community or State or nation in which located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among asso-
ciates or in the community.
(z2)ludgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgmenf entered after
a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging
a person guitty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not includi^g, when
offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than im-
peachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of
an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
(23)ludgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judg-
ments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries,
essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputa-
tion.
Utah R. Evid.807. Residual Exception
(a) In General. Uncler the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not
excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically
covered by ahearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804:
(1) the staiement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
igi t, is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evid.ence thaf the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and
(4) actmitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice.
iU; t toti.e. The statement is admissible only if, before the lrial or hearing, the
proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the
,tutl*"rrt and its particulars, including the declarant's name and address, so that
the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.

Utah R. Evid.901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence
(a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an
item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.
(b) Examples. The following are exalnples only--not a complete list--of evidence
that satisfies the requirement:
(1) Testintony of aWitness rttith Knozoledge. Testimony that an item is what it is
claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert Opinion Abor.tt Handzttriting. A nonexpert's opinion that
handwriting is genuine, based on a familiarity with it that was not acquired
for the current litigation.
(3) Comparison by nn ExpertWitness or the Trier of Fact. A comparison with an
authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the trier of fact.
(4) Distinctizte Characteristics and the Like, The appeararlce, contents, substance,,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken
together with all the circumstances.
(5) Opinion About a Voice. An opinion identifying a person's voice--whether
heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or
recording--based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that
connect it with the alleged speaker.
(6) Eaidence About a Telephone Conrtersstion. For a telephone conversatiory
evidence tirat a call was made to the number assigned at the time to:
(A) u particular persorL if circumstances, including self-identification,
show that the person answering was the one called; or
(B) a particular business, if the call was made to a business and the call
related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.
(7) Euidence About Public Records. Evidence that:
(A) u document was recorded or filed in a public office as authorizedby
law; or
(B) u purported public record or statement is from the office where items
of this kind are kept.
(B) Eaidence Abottt Ancient Documents or Dnta Compilations. For a document or
clata compilation, evidence that it:
(A) is in a condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity;
(B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be; and
(C) is at least 20 years old when offered.
(9) Euidence Abottt a Process or Systeru, Evidence describirg u process or system
and showing that it produces an accurate result.
(10) M'ethods Prouidedby a Ststute or Rule. Any method of authentication or
identification allowed by court rule or statuie of this state.
Utah R. Evid. 1006. Summaries to prove content
The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of
voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently
examined in court. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable
time or place. And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court'
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LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
JARED W. RASBAND, 1,2633
Deputy District Attorney
1i 1 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Teiephone: (801) 363-790A
&
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
iN AND FOR THE COLINTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF A ) SIIBPOENA DUCES TECIIM
CRMINAL INVESTIGATION ) csNo
THE STATE OF UTA}I TO: CUSTODIAN OF NECORDS
FRONTIER COMMUNITY BANK
7525 SOUTTI ANION PARK AWNAE
MIDVALE, UT 84047
PHONE: (801) 562-2272
You are hereby commanded to set aside all business and excuses and appear at the Office
of the District Attorney for Salt Lake County, 111 East Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City,
Utah, at the hour of 10:00 AM on the 3rd day of May 2011, to give testimony in aid of a criminal
investigation. You are entitled to be represented by legal counsel at the time of this examination.
You are also commanded to bring with you copies of any and all account records
belonging to Eilipse Technology, Irc., and/or David Buttars, SSN for the period
of January l,2007,through and including April 1,,201,1, to include but not limited to:
signature cardsa
a
a
monthly bank statements
deposit tickets
ae credit and debit memos
00797
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: 
"ff*,::,or'r'r]]ls 
checks' rravelers checks' Monev orders' etc')
o CTRs and CMIRs
o Real estate or Chattle Mortgages
. Account holder information
:il:",ffiondence
Withdrawals
r Transfers, to include wire transfers
Your affrant is seeking only copies of any and all forms of identification used to open
accounts, applications to open the accounts, signature cards, monthly bank statements showing
deposits, withdrawals, and incoming and outgoing wire transfers at this time; however, if other
information is d.eemed necessary, your affiant wil request further documents.
ARE
to ers
of the subDoena. the information being sought, qr-the existence of ari investigation. as.it
could impede this oneoins crimin{l inyestisation.
TEB OF
DRTVE, BLDG. 1OO, SALT LAKE CITY, UN4H 841T6.
. If you are specifically notified by the agent serving this subpoena that delivery or making
available the requested documents is all that is requested, it shall not be necessary for you to
appear at the time and place designated above, However, such documents should be d.elivered or
made available by you prior to that date and timc to excuse you fi'om the duty to appear.
&
&
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6i Failure to respond to this Subpoena may result in the District Attorney's Office for Salt
Lake County seeking an Order of Contempt from the District Court.
Given under myhand this 2-\ day of Aprilz}ll'. :
Clerk of the Court
Deputy
of
qr
rtl
o ST F
T EA oA
v*
)
CI TY
€j
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SIM GILL
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
BLAKE A. NAKAMURA, 6288
Deputy District Afforney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
e
IN TFIE THIRD JUDiCIAL DISTzuCT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COIINTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
iN THE MATTER OF A ) SUBPOENADUCES TECUM
CzuMINAL INVESTIGATION ) csNo. 11-e1
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: CUSTODAN OF HZCORDS
JP MORGAN CIIASE BANK, N.A.
C/O CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
136 EAST SOarH TEMPLE, SUITE 2100
9ALT L/IKE CITY, UTAH 84111
PHONE: (801) s31-7090
you are hereby commanded to set aside all business and excuses and appear at the Office
of the District Attorney for Salt Lake county, 111 East Broadway, suite 400, Salt Lake city,
Utah, at the hour of 10:00 AM on the23rd day of March 2012, to give testimony in aid of a
criminal investigation. you are entitled to be represented by legal counsel at the time of this
examination. you are also commanded to bring with you copies of any and all account records
belonging to Ellipse Technology, Inc., and/or David Buttars, SSN for the period
of January | , 2007 , through and including April I , 2011 , to include but not limited to:
signature cards
monthly bank statements
deposit tickets
&
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. credit and debit memos
bank checks (Cashier's Checks, Travelers Checks, Money Orders, etc,)
applications for credit
CTRs and CMIRs
Real estate or Chattle Mortgages
Account holder information
Account numbers
. Customercorrespondence
. Withdrawals
o Transfers, to include wire transfers
Your affiant is seeking only copies of any and all forms of identification used to open
accounts, applications to open the accounts, signature cards, monthly bank statements showing
deposits, withdrawals, and incoming and outgoing wire transfers at this time; however, if other
information is deemed necessary, your affiant will request further documents.
YOU ARE ADVISED that oursuant to 877 1(4). Iltah Code
u
Annotated. 1953. as ended. vou are not to disclose to anv Derson the existence or service
of the subpoena. the information being-gought..or the existence of an investigLtjon. as it
could impede this ongoine criminal investigation.
PLEASE FORWARD THE REOAESTED DOCUMENTS TO .IGENT SCOTT
NESBITT, STATE BUREAU OF INWSTIGATION, 55OO WEST A.MELIA EARIIART
DRIW, BLDG. IOO, SALT LAKE CITY, TITAH 84116.
. If you are specificaliy notified by the agent serving this subpoena that delivery or making
available the requested documents is all that is requested, it shall not be necessary for you toC
0081 I
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appear at the time and place designated above. However, such documents should be delivered or
made available by you prior to that date and time to excuse you from the duty to appear.
Failure to respond to this Subpoena may result in the District Attorney's Office for Salt
Lake County seeking an Order of Contempt from the District Court.
Given under my hand thir 4Say of Marc h2012.
Clerk of the Court
of this
t
JUDGE
Is(4K c1
c
lJ
&
C
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sIM GIL! : ., :
Diskict Attomey folSpft Lakg County
BLAKP A.,NAKAM_IIRA, 6288
DgPutY Dlstnct AttomeY i '
111 East Bloadway, Sufte 400 ' ,
Salt Lake'City- Utah 8411i
Telephohe:, (801) l6i3 -:l 900
&
.:. .t r' . -.
SUBPoENA DUCES rECqI4.
CRMINAL INVESTIGATION,
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: RECORDS
. . :, ,. ..,: .'. .
BANK
PAW CrTy, UTAH 84095
You are hereby commanded to set aside all business and excuses and appear at the Office
of the Diqfrict Altorney for Salt Lake County, 111 East Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City,
Utah, at the hour of 10:00 Alt4 on the 13th day of IuIy 201"2, to give testimony in aid of a
j
criminal investigation. You are entitled to be represented by legal counsel at the time of this
examrnatron.
You are also commanded to bring with copies of any and ali account records belonging to
Movieblitz North America, and/or Mark La Count, SSN to include accounts
utrd I, to include but not limited to applications to open the
accounts, copies of signature cards, copies of forms of identification used to open the accounts,
account holder(s) names, monthly account statements, copies of deposited items, copies of
Q
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for incoming
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are speci{qaJly notifie{,by the agent serving thiq,subpoena that delivery or making
the requested documents is all that requested, it shall not be for you to
appeat at the time and place designated above. However, such documents should be delivered or
made available by you prior to that date and time to excuse you from the duty to appear.
...1
Failure to reqpond to this Subpoena may result in the District Attorney's Office for Salt
Lake County seeking an Order of Contempt from the District Court.
Givenunder myhar day of August2072.
Clerk of the Court
Approved the is
r)
Er
a
00835
q)
:ss.
County of Salt Lake , )
I heqeby certify that qn the day of
€;
witness, to,wit:
Custodian Of Recolds, Frontier Community B ank, Subp o ena Complianc e D ep artrnent
- . . .i
by showing the personally and
DATED this v4- zorz.
C
00836

"t,
Addendum C
Addendurn C

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 28,2015
07:35:37 PM
lsl
JACOB S. TAYLOR, Bar No. 10840
Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL D. PALUMBO, Bar No. 13325
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES, Bar No. 7969
Utah Attorney General
5272 South College Drive, #200
Murray, Utah84l23
Telephone: (80 1) 281-1221
Facsimile : (801) 281 -1224
Email : i acobstavlor(Eutah. sov
mpalumbo@utah.gov
Attorneys for the State of Utah
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID BRUCE BUTTARS,
Defendant Judge: Vernice Trease
INTRODUCTION
On September 7,2015, Defendant David Bruce Buttars filed a motion to suppress bank
records the State obtained from JP Morgan Chase Bank and Frontier Bank through investigative
subpoenas issued under the Subpoena Powers for Aid in Criminal Investigation and Grant of
Immunity Act ("subpoena Powers Act"), Utah Code Ann. SectionTT-22-1. The Court held an
evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress and other motions on September 14,
2015. The State filed an opposition to Defendant's motion to suppress on October 13,2015.
FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Case No. l3l90I5I2
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Defendants filed a reply on November 13,2015.
On Decemb er 3 , 2015 the Court heard oral arguments on the Defendant's motion.
Assistant Attorneys General Jacob Taylor and Michael Palumbo appeared on behalf of the State
CataTangaro and Robert Cummings appeared on behalf of the Defendant. Defendant was
present at the hearing. The District Court, having reviewed the written materials filed by the
parties and hearing oral arguments, ruled from the bench on Decemb er 3,2015 denying the
Defendant's motion. The Court now enters the following written Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order denying Defendant's motion consistent with its December 3,2015 ruling.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following factual findings are undisputed and based on filings by the parties, exhibits, and
testimony obtained during the September 14, 2015 evidentiary hearing in this matter.
The Defendant's September 7,2015 motion to suppress concerned investigative
subpoenas issued by the State between April 2011 and August 2012 under the Subpoena Powers
Act during an investigation of Defendant for securities fraud and other crimes. The subpoenas
sought bank records from Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase Bank.
The subpoenas contained references to an irrelevant section of the Utah Criminal Code,
Utah Code Ann. SectionTT-22a. Specifically, the subpoenas told the recipients of the subpoenas
(JP Morgan Chase Bank and Frontier Bank) that under Utah Code Ann. SectionTT-22a,they
were prohibited from disclosing the subpoenas to any third party. The inclusion of this language
was an erTor.
Prior to issuing the investigative subpoenas, the State filed a Statement of Good Cause
with the Third District Court and obtained an Order authorizing the investigation under the
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Subpoena Powers Act from a magistrate. A magistrate reviewed and signed the Statement of
Good Cause.
A magistrate reviewed each subpoena before it was issued. The magistrate's review was
for the purpose of determining whether the subpoenas were reasonably related to the criminal
investigation authorized by the court, as required under Utah Code Ann. SectionTT-22-2(3Xb)
(ii). The Defendant does not challenge the good cause basis for the criminal investigation or that
the subpoenas were reasonably related to the criminal investigation.
The State did not seek or obtain a secrecy order from the Court to keep the investigation
or materials obtained through the subpoenas secret.
After serving the subpoenas on JP Morgan Chase Bank and Frontier Bank, the State
obtained bank records of the Defendant.
The State did not notify Defendant when it sought an order authorizing a criminal
investigation, nor did the State noti$r Defendant when it issued subpoenas to the Defendant's
banks.
The bank records obtained by the state through the investigative subpoenas were used in
an investigation that led to criminal charges against Defendant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The questions presented by Defendant's motion are: (1) Whether the subpoenas issued by
the State were unlawful due to the erroneous reference to Utah Code Ann. SectionTT-22a or
because the State did not give notice to the Defendant when the subpoenas were issued; (2) if the
subpoenas were unlawful, would the good faith exception apply; (3) and finally, if the subpoenas
were unlawful, whether exclusion would be the appropriate remedy.
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Although individuals in Utah have an expectation of privacy right in bank records, the
State may nevertheless search and seize bank records through a lawful subpoena under the
Subpoena Powers Act.
A. The State is Not Required to Give Notice to a Suspect in a Criminal Investigation When
the state Issues subpoenas to Banks for a suspect's Bank Records
The Subpoena Powers Act does not require the State to provide notice to the subject of a
criminal investigation when the State initiates an investigation or issues subpoenas under the
Subpoena Powers Act. Neither State v. Yount,2008 UT App 102, 182 P.3d 405 (2008) , nor State
v. Thompson ,810 P .2d 4I5 (Utah 1 99 1), creates a notice requirement for subpoenas issued under
the Subpoena Powers Act. Furthermore, the Subpoena Powers Act, itself, does not contain a
requirement that the State provide notice to the subject of records when the State issues an
investigative subpoena. The notice requirements in the Subpoena Powers Act pertain only to the
party to whom the subpoena is issued-in this case, the banks.
State v. Thompson was a case decided under the pre-1989 version of the Subpoena
Powers Act and the changes in the Act appear to be a direct response to the issues in Thompson
andln the Matter of Criminal Investigation,754P.2d633 (1988). Inthose cases, the issues
centered on whether a defendant had a right to privacy in bank records, and whether the state
should seekjudicial approval to obtain bank records because ofdefendant's expectation of
privacy.
B. The Erroneous Reference to Utah Code Ann. SectionTT-22a Did Not Render the
Subpoenas Unlawful
The inclusion of the secrecy language from Utah Code Ann Section 77-22ain the
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subpoenas did not make the subpoenas unlawful or unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The state met all the requirements of obtaining
a lawful subpoena by having the subpoenas reviewed and signed by a magistrate who also
determined that the subpoenas were reasonably related to a criminal investigation based on good
cause.
The secrecy provision of the Subpoena Powers Act exists to protect the innocent and to
prevent criminal suspects from having access to information prior to prosecution. The fact that
the 77-22alanguage was included in the subpoenas does not render the subpoenas unlawful.
Whether a secrecy order is properly granted is not a basis for attacking the validity of the
underlying subpoena. This is particularly true in the present case where the Defendant has not
attacked the good cause statement or that the subpoenas were reasonably related to the criminal
investigation. The purpose of the secrecy order is not to create a right for the defendant to move
to suppress the evidence.
Even if the secrecy provision was not included in the subpoena, there is no evidence that
the defendant would have known about the subpoenas or that he would have successfully moved
to quash them.
C. Even if the Subpoenas Were Found to be Unlawful, the Good Faith Exception Would
Apptv
The reasoning applied by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Dominguez,248 P .3d 473
(2011), is compelling in the present case. Failing to meet perfectly the procedural requirements
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of the subpoena powers act, or in this case, including the language from77-22a, does not
automatically implicate the Defendant's constitutional rights. The Court has determined that
including the 77-22a language did not render the subpoenas unlawful. But, even if it did, the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply to this case. The state and federal
cases that have applied to the good faith exception are on par with the present case. Specifically,
the cases dealing with search warrants are instructive.
The ruling in State v. Thompsoa is based on different facts, and was decided under the
pre-1989 Subpoena Powers Act. Under the Act in effect at the time of Thompson,the State had
the unilateral authority to issue subpoenas without judicial oversi glx. Thompson is
distinguishable from the present case due to the fact that the State obtained judicial review of the
investigative subpoenas and reasonably relied on the Court's approval of the subpoenas.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, consistent with the District Court's December 3,2015 ruling from the bench, the
District Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
SIGNATURE CONTAINED ON TOP OF FIRST PAGE
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated; April08,2016 ls/ Y
09:33:10 AM
SUBMITTED BY
CARA M. TANGARO (9197)
TANGARO LAW, P.C.
35 West Broadway, Suite 203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (80 1 ) 673-9984
c ar a(A lans,aro law. c o m
Robert B. Cumrnings (SBN 13186)
The Salt Lake Lawyers
10 Exchange Place, Suite 622
salt Lake ciry, uT 84111
T: (801) 590-7ss5
F: (801) 384-082s
E : robert@thesaltlakelaw)rers. corn
Attorneys for D efendant
IN THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COIINTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-v-
DAVID BRUCE BUTTARS,
Defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF I.AW ON
STATE'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE
Case No.: I3I90I5I2
Judge: Vernice Trease
Plaintiff, the state of Utah (the "State") filed a Motion for Admission of Evidence (the
"Motion") on August 28,20L5. The Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the Motion, along
with Defendant David Bruce Buttars' ("Mr. Buttars") Motion to Suppress, on September 14, 2015.
Pursuant to the Court's scheduling order entered on the record on September 14,2015 (docket,
912412015, Hr'ing Trans, at96-97), the State filed a Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for
Admission of Evidence on October 13, 20L5. Mr. Buttars filed his Opposition to the State's Motion
on November 13, 2015.Finally, on Novemb er 27 ,2015,the State filed its reply in further support of
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the Motion. Further more the Court incorporates by reference the ruling issued on the record on this
motion.
Having considered the briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court hereby DENIES the
Motion without prejudice. The State may resubmit the motion and raise Rule 703 second prong and
other hearsay issues. As explained below, while the Court finds that the State met its burden of
proving the authenticity of the bank records at issue, the bank records are still nonetheless hearsay
evidence. And the State has not met its burden of providing sufficient evidence to establish
foundation for a hearsay exception to apply. Because the parties did not brief the second prong of
Utah R. Evid. 703 (i.e., the probative value of disclosing the bank records to the jury substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect), the Court denies the State's Motion at this time.
BACKGROUND
The State moves for an order of the Court admitting evidence in advance of trial pursuant to
Utah R. Evid. 104. Specifically, the State seeks admission of summaries of bank records at issue in
this case' In its supplemental brief in support of the Motion, the State argues that the summaries are
admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 703, 803(6), and 1006. Mr. Buttars makes two arguments as to
why the summaries are not admissible. First, Mr. Buttars argues that the summaries are not
admissible based upon his arguments raised in his Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Docket,
917120t5.) The Court denied Mr. Buttars' Motion to Suppress. (Docket, 111212016.) Therefore, the
Court rejects Mr. Buttars' first argument based upon the reasons stated in the order denying Mr.
Buttars' Motion to Suppress.(ld.)
Second, Mr. Buttars argues that the summaries are inadmissible because the underlying bank
records upon which the State bases its summaries are inadmissible. Specifically, Mr. Buttars argues
that the bank records have insufficient foundation and lack authenticity. The Court *ill address each
of these arguments in turn.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The State has seven (7) summaries prepared based upon various bank records collected
pursuant to subpoenas issued in this case. (Docket,9ll4l2015, State's Exhs. 1 through 7.)
2. The State's accounting expert, John Curtis, prepared the summaries based upon the bank
records obtained from JP Morgan Chase and Frontier Bank.
3. John Curtis has been a forensic accountant for 17 years.
4. Based upon the submissions by the parties, Mr. Curtis appears to be qualified to opine as a
forensic accountant.
5. Mr. Curtis received and reviewed the bank records.
6. Regarding the Frontier Bank records, it appears that the Agent Nesbit collected the records
in person, via U.S. Mail, and also via E-Mail.
7. There are, however, only two custodian certifications provided by Frontier Bank with some
ofthe records.
8. Mr. Curtis testified during the September 14,2015 evidentiary hearing that it did not appear
that any of the bank records were missing,
9. Likewise, Mr. Curtis testified that he received and reviewed the verifications provided by
Frontier Bank with the bank records.
10.There are two records custodian certificates from Frontier Bank,
1 l.Agent Nesbit testified that he received records from Frontier Bank on three or four
occasions.
12.The bank records are voluminous in nature.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The State bears the burden of proving admissibility. At play in the State's Motion are Utah
R. Evid. 703, 803, 901, and 1006. Each are discussed below.
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l. Utah R. Evid. 1006
Utah R. Evid. 1006 provides, in pertinent part, "[t]he proponent may use a surnmary, chart,
or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot
be conveniently examined in court." This is an exception to the best evidence rule, Utah R. Evid.
1002. As noted above, the moving party, the State here, bears the burden of "establishfing] a
foundation that the underlying materials on which [the summaries] are based are admissible
evidence." Trolley v. Square Assocs. v. Nielson,886 p.2d 61,67 (utah Ct. App. rgg4).
Here, the voluminous requirement of Utah R. Evid. 1006 is satisfied. Rule 1006, however,
cannot be used as a cover for inadmissible evidence. Therefore, in order to make the summaries
admissible, the State must: 1) there must be competent evidence to establish authenticity; and2)
provide testimony to establish the foundation for the underlying bank records.
t. Authentici8
Pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 901, "[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying
an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is." Utah R. Evid. 901(a). The rule provides a non-exhaustive
list of examples through which the proponent of evidence can satisfu the requirement. Relevant here
are subsection (1) and (4). Subsection (1) states: "Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge.
Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be." Utah R. Evid. 901(bxl). Subsection (4) states:
"Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or
uLher distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with atl the circumstances.,'Utah R.
Evid. e0l(b)(a).
These two subsections are met here. To the first subsection, Agent Nesbit is a "witness with
knowledge." At thc September L4,2015 eviclentiary hearing, Agent Nesbit testified that he either
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personally picked up the bank records from Frontier Bank or otherwise received them via U.S. Mail
or E-Mail from Frontier Bank. To the fourth subsection, Mr. Curtis, the State's forensic accountant,
testified that the bank records appeared to be complete. Therefore, the State has met its burden of
authentication as required by Utah R. Evid. 901.
I. Expertos Reliance on Inadmissible Evidence
The State contends that the bank records are admissible based upon Utah R. Evid. 703 and
901. Utah R. Evid. 703 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or
data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the
subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted." In other words, once the expert
is qualified, that expert can rely upon inadmissible evidence. But the rule continues: "But if the facts
or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury
only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect." Utah R. Evid. 703.
Regardless if the bank records are ultimately admissible on their own, the Court finds that
Mr. Curtis can rely upon the bank records as part of his expert opinion. Mr. Curtis appears to be
qualified to testify as a forensic accountant. He has practiced as a forensic accountant for 17 years,
and otherwise appears to be competent to testify in that field. Because Mr. Curtis appears to be
qualified to opine as a forensic accountant, Mr. Curtis can rely upon the bank records to form his
opinion.
t. Admissibilitv of BankRecords
Utah R. Evid. 802 states that "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by
these rules." While the Court finds that the State has provided sufficient evidence to authenticate the
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bank records and that Mr. Curtis can rely upon the bank records pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 703, the
hearsay consideration is different than authentication and Rule 703. And the Court fincls that the
entries on the bank records are hearsay.
The State contends that Utah R. Evid. 303(6) applies here as an exception to the hearsay
rule. That rule states that "[a] record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis [is admissible]
if' certain conditions are met. Utah R. Evid. 803(6). In order to meet this requirement, the State
must show: "(A) the record was made at or near the time by - or from information transmitted by -
someone with knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of
a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; (C) making the record was
a regular practice of that activity; ... [and] (E) neither the source of information nor the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate of lack of trustworthiness." Utah R. Evid. 803(6)(A)-(E). The
rule provides, however, that (A) through (C) can be "shown by the testimony of the custodian or
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a
statute permitting certification[.]" Utah R. Evid. 803(6XD).
In short, the State needs to provide foundation in support of the bank records to establish an
indicia of reliability. The State has not been able to establish the necessary foundation. The record
reflects that there are two records custodian certificates from Frontier Bank, and the State has
conceded that there are no other records custodian certificates. Agent Nesbit testified, however, that
he received records from Frontier Bank on three or four occasions. Therefore, the State has not met
its burden under Utah R. Evid. 803(6) and 902(11)-(12). The bank records contain inadmissible
hearsay, and are therefore inadmissible on their own.
Rule 703, however, has an additional component. In order to have inadmissible evidence
upon which an expert relies disclosed to the jury, the proponent of the evidence must establish that
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the "probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect." The parties have not briefed this issue. Therefore, the Court cannot at this point
decide the issue of admissibility under the second prong of Rule 703.
IT IS SO ORDERED,
[Court's Signature Appears at the Top of the First Page of this OrderJ
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INTRODUCTION
After considering the State's Motion for the Admission of Evidence, as well as all briefs,
evidence, and arguments by the parties, the Court GRANTS the State's motion to admit bank
record summaries at trial.
FINDINGS OF'FACT
On August 28,2015, the State moved this Court to rule on the admissibility of bank
record summaries prior to trial. The State argued, among other things that the sumrnaries are
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admissible under Utah R. of Evid. 1006 because they distill voluminous bank records that cannot
be conveniently examined in court. Further, the State argued that the underlying bank records
upon which the summaries are based are admissible under Utah R. of Evid. 703, or alternatively
under Utah R. of Evid. 303(6).
An evidentiary hearing was held on September 14,2015 during which John Curtis, the
State's forensic accounting expert, and special Agent scoff Nesbitt testified. During that hearing,
Agent Nesbitt testified that beginning in 2011 he sought and obtained investigative subpoenas
thrtlugh the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. Agent Nesbitt described the process he
followed for obtaining the subpoenas, and further testified that he obtained responsive bank
records on several occasions from Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase. Agent Nesbitt testified
that he scanned and made copies of these records and provided them to the Attorney General,s
Office and the Division of Securities. Agent Nesbitt testified that the records he obtained from
Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase appeared to be complete. In total, Agent Nesbitt obtained
records for six Frontier Bank accounts, and four JP Morgan Chase bank accounts. In addition
Agent Nesbitt obtained certificates of authenticity from Frontier Bank and Jp Morgan Chase
Bank.
Also during the September 14, 201 5 hearing, John Curtis testified that he received copies
of the bank records from the Attomey General's Office. Mr. Curtis reviewed all of the bank
records, which consisted of approximately 500-700 pages. Mr. Curtis determined that the bank
records appearcd to be complete. Mr. Curtis testified that some check images were missing from
the records. However, Mr. Curtis testified, this is not uncommon. Mr. Curtis did not send out his
own subpoenas, but he verified and. analyzed the records he reviewed. Based on Mr. Curtis,s
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review, it appeared to him that the bank records were what they purported to be. Based on Mr.
Curtis's review of the bank records, he formed an opinion as to whether the transactions at issue
in this case had characteristics of fraud.
This Court heard oral argument on the State's motion for the admission of evidence, and
other motions, on December 3,2015.
On February 22,2016 this Court denied the State's motion without prejudice. The Court
issued written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 8,2016. The Court denied the
State's motion to admit evidence pursuant to Utah R. of Evid. 703 because, while the State
established the first prong of Utah R. of Evid. 703 (i.e. bank records are the type of evidence a
forensic accounting expert would typically rely upon), the State did not address the second prong
of Rule 703 (i.e. the evidence is more probative to helping the jury evaluate the expert opinion).
The Court also held that the State met its burden of proving authenticity of the bank records. The
Court invited further briefing on the issue of admissibility of the bank records and/or summaries
to address the second prong ofRule 703 and other hearsay issues.
On March 16,2016 the State submitted its Second Supplemental Brief in support of its
motion to admit evidence. In that brief, the State addressed the second prong of Utah R. of Evid.
703. The State also made an alternative argument under the residual hearsay exception, Utah R.
of Evid. 807. Defendant filed an opposition, and the State filed a reply. Oral argument was held
on May 10, 2016.
On May 23,2016 the Court issued an oral ruling on the State's second supplemental
brief, and GRANTED the State's motion for admission of evidence. The Court incorporated by
reference its prior Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order from February 22,2016.
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CONCLUSIONS OF'LAW
Evidence admitted under Utah R. of Evid. 703 canbe used only for the purpose of
assisting the jury in evaluating an expert's opinion. Evidence admitted under Utah R. of Evid.
807 can be used for its substance. The Court finds that the bank records and bank summaries are
admissible under the residual hearsay exception, Utah R. of Evid. Ruie 807. Because the bank
records and summaries are admissible for their substance under Rule 807, the Court does not
address whether the records or sunmaries are also admissible under Rule 703.
I. The Bank Records Are Admissible under utah R. of Evid. g07
utah R' of Evid. 807 allows hearsay statements to be admitted even if the statement is not
specifically covered by a hearsay exception Utah R. of Evid. 803 or 804, as long as the statement
satisfies four prongs:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a materi al fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence that the proponent can obtain through
reasonable efforts; and
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the
interests ofjustice.
Additionally, in order for a statement to be admitted uncler Utah R. of Evid. g07, the
proponent of the evidence must provide the opposing party "reasonable notice of the intent to
offer the statement and its particulars, including the declarant's name and address, so that the
party has a fair opportunity to meet it.,,
The bank records that the State seeks to introduce were lawfully obtained through
subpoena (See Order, December 28,2015). Additionally, the bank records have been properly
authenticated. (see order, April 8, 2016, at 5). Taking all facts and arguments into
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consideration, this Court finds that the bank records from Frontier and JP Morgan Chase satisfu
each of the four prongs of the residual hearsay exception, Utah R. of Evid. g07.
a. The Notice Requirement Has Been Met
On August 28,2015 the State provided notice to this Court and the defendant that it
intends to introduce summaries of bank records attrial. The defendant has been on notice of the
State's intent to introduce the bank records and/or summaries for many months.
The State initially sought to introduce the bank records and summaries under Rule 703.
However, on March 16,2016 the State argued for admission of the bank records or summaries
under Utah R. of Evid. 807 in its second supplemental brief. Defendant has had an opportunity to
respond to this argument in his opposition, filed on April 1I,2016. At that time, a jury trial was
not set. It was not until May 10, 2016 that the Court set a four day jury trial for September 2016.
The jury trial is several months away. The defendant has had a fair opportunity to respond to the
State's argument for admission under Utah R. of Evid. 807. Additionally, the defendant has had
an opportunity to cross examine John Curtis and Agent Nesbift regarding the records. Defendant
will have further opportunities to do so at trial. The defendant has a substantial amount of time to
prepare to meet the evidenc e attrial. Therefore the Court finds that the State has satisfied the
notice requirement of Utah R. of Evid. 807.
b. The Bank Statements Have Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of
Trustworthiness
The question under the first prong of Rule 807 is whether the bank records have
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, similar to other exceptions under the
hearsay rules such as business records, family records, certain public records, and so forth. In
this case, the bank records have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. There is
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both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support the trustworthiness of the records. Therefore, the
first factor of Utah R. of Evid. 807 weighs in favor of admission of the bank records.
First, although the State cannot produce authentication certificates for all bank records
the State obtained from Frontier Bank, the State does have certificates for some of the Frontier
bank records.r These certificates state the things required by Utah R. of Evid. g03(6) to establish
trustworthiness for records of regularly conducted activity. For example, the certificates state that
that the records were kept in the usual course of business, and that the entries in the bank records
were generally prepared contemporaneously with the events described. In other words, the
certificates generally describe the authenticity of records maintained by that bank, and speak to
the reliability of the bank records. All Frontier bank records were provided to the state by the
same personnel and in the same manner in response to lawful subpoenas.
Further, the bank records have been authenticated under Rule 902 through the testimony
of Agent Nesbitt and John Curtis. Agent Nesbitt testified about how he obtained the records
through an investigative subpoena. Mr. Curtis is a forensic accountant with 17 years of
experience and a CPA' In light of testimony presented about his qualifications, education, and
experience, the Court has found that he is an expert qualified to testify and give an opinion on
bank records, fraudulent aotivities rclatcd to finances, inclutling investigating and analyzing
records of companies, banks, and individuals alleged to have engaged in fraud. Mr. Curtis
testified that he received and reviewed the bank records from Frontier and Jp Morgan Chase. He
also testified that he reviewed these accounts and all the information related to these accounts. It
did not appear to Mr. Curtis that any records were missing from the bank records, aside from one
I JP Morgan Chase provided certificates of authentication that appear to meet the requirements of Rule g03(6).
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or two missing check images. But, this is fairly cornmon, and not a big issue in determining the
accuracy and so forth of the records. Mr. Curtis also testified that there were approximately 500-
700 pages of the records. He reviewed the records to determine if they were what they purported
to be and if he could rely on the records to render his opinion. He testified that in every way, thc
bank records appeared to be authentic documents.
The Court finds that the bank records have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, and so meet the first prong of Utah R. of Evid. 807.
c. The bank records are evidence of a material fact
It is uncontroverted that bank records and/or summaries are crucial to this case. The bank
records/summaries are evidence of a material fact. This factor weighs in favor of admission.
d. The bank records are more probative than any other evidence to show
how investor funds were used
The third factor of Utah R. of Evid. 807 weighs in favor of admission. The bank records,
andlor summaries, are more probative of whether a fraud or theft occurred because they show
what happened to the investment money of victims. There is no other evidence that can be
presented or obtained through other reasonable means or efforts to show what happened to
investor funds, which is a vital question in this case.
e. Admitting the bank records will serve the best interests of justice.
A jury trial is a search for truth. The evidence contained in the bank records and
summaries can assist in that search. Whether the bank records and summaries benefit the state or
the defendant is not the determining factor. The testimony given by Mr. Curtis and Agent Nesbitt
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is that these records contain infbrmation about the money alleged to be invested and how it was
used' The bank records come in regardless of whether the records show the money was used
appropriately or inappropriately. The purposes of the rules and interest ofjustice is met when
trusfworthy, relevant information and evidence is admitted to assist the jury in the search for the
truth.
ORDER
The bank records satisfy all four prongs of Utah R. of Evid. 807. The State has also
provided notice to the defendant as required under that rule. Therefore, the bank records are
admissible for their substance. Because the bank records are admissible, this Court finds the
summaries of bank records are admissible under Rule 1006
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the State's Motion for Admission of
Evidence.
COURT'S SIGNATURE CONTAINED ON TOP OF FIRST PAGE
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Addendum F
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misstatements of material facts, not to omit information
thatrs necessary in order to understand material fact.
A. And based on your e:q>erience in the
securities industry, couJ-d you etq>lain how fraud is
defined in the securities industry?
A. General-J.y, it's -- fraud is considered when
you have a misstatement of material information, or the
omission of materiaL information necessary to address a
misstatementr ot a deceit.
A. And you mentioned the phrase 'material
statementst. Based on your experience in the securities
industry, could you give some examples of what materiaL
statements may entai1?
A. That's it's information --
MR. CUMMINGS: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: APProach.
(Whereupon a sidebar was hel-d as folLows) .
MR. CTMMINGS: This is the situation, I beJ.ieve
that the Chapman court addressed two things, one is
defining what is a material- misstatement, the second
thing is providing examples. My concern is that the
examples are going to be too closeJ-y related to this
case, and at 1east one judge in -- was it Chapman, or --
THE COURT: Moore.
MR. PALUMBO: I think you're thinking of Moore.
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MR. CUMMINGS: Moore, thank you.
MR. PAIITMBO: (Inaudible) .
MR. CUMMINGS: But it was too prejudiciaL to give
the exampl-es of the statements. The second, thing r would
submit is that in this case, all these statements or
alleged statements and al.leged omissions are squarely
within a reasonable juryrs mindset. rt's not needed. we
dontt need e:q>ert testimony to say that -- whether a jury
wiLl -- a reasonabre investor in a juryrs mind wirr say
what about credit card debt needs to know ahout the prior
(inaudible) stuff arong those lines. rtrs not complex.
MR. PAIII4BO: And your Honor, I have a copy of the
Moore decision if you wouLd Like it for your reference,
but I beLieve the issue in Moore is that there was a
discussion of material misstatements, and how the
security e:q>ert defined them. The'issue was that the
e:<pert in tha.t ca.se was opining on what the l_aw said
rather than what the industry dictates. And so, when I
ask, based on your experience in the industry, f'm not
asking the expert to tel1 me what the raw is. r'm asking
him to tel]. me what his e:q>erience in the industry when
he forms his opinion.
MR. CITMMfNGS: The distinction with that is the
(inaudibre) wourd still be able to make a concrusion
that's in the jury's providence. And again, these arenrt
40
25
04828
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I
9
complex issues.
MR. PAIUMBO: Irm simply asking also for an example
of what the material misstatement might be. I'm not
asking the e:q>ert to talk about whatt s groing on in this
case, and to teJ-J- the jury that whatrs happening in this
case is a materia]- distinction.
THE COITRT: If the wit -- if the witness says
something that is -- was a material omissj.on in this
case, do you see that as a problem?
MR. PALTMBO: Pardon me?
THE COURT: If the witness says -- gives an example
of a material omitment -- a material. omission, and it's
something that was done in this case, do you see the
problem with that?
MR. PALTMBO: No, because I think he could provide
a number of exampJ-es, as long' as the exampl-es dontt
exactJ-y track the facts of this case, and hers not --
MS. TAIIGARO: And that's what she's asking.
THE COURT: That's what Itm saying.
MR. PAIUMBO: But I'm saying, if those are the only
examples he provides, rather than providing'a -- you
know, ED inclusive list of various tlpes of exampJ-es in
other cases that wouLd be material
THE COIJRT: Do you anticipate that the witness wiJ-J-
give examples that are included in this case?
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MR. PALIIMBO: Yes. yeah. But not exclusively.
trHE COURT: l&n-hmm.
MS . TAI{GARO: I don' t think that' s
!4R. CITMMINGS: Thatr s the concern.
MS. TAI{GARO: I think thatts objectionrtJ-e
(inaudible) .
THE COURT: Okay. I t m going -- I'm g'oing to
sustain the objection for now, but you can ask the
witness to define what the definition is of material
statements, and so forth, but I donrt think it would be
appropriate for him to give examples that would incrude
what was mentioned in this case because then he would be
sayingr you know, thatls a material omission (inaudible).
MR. PAIUMBO: Sure.
THE COIIRT: Okay.
MR. PALUMBO: Thank you.
(End of sidebar).
A. (BY MR. PATUMBO) Mr. Lloyd, based on your
e:q>erience in the industry, could you give a working
definition of material misstatement?
A. WeJ-L, iE would be a misstatement of
information that a reasonabre investor would consider
important in making a decision whether to purchase or to
seIl a security.
A. In the context of the securities industry,
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are you familiar with the term, 'wilJ.ful,'?
A. Yes.
A. And in the securities industry, what does
that term mean?
A. It's generally understood to mean an
intentional in the case, for exampJ-e, of statements,
an intentional statement.
A. And based on your e:q>erience in the industry,
is a seJ-J.er required to disclose aJ.J. materiaL
information?
A. A seller is the industry expectation is
that a seller will not misrepresent any materiaL
information or omit to provide materiaL information
thatrs necessary to correct a misstatement.
A. With respect to a purchaser of a security, in
the seeurities industry, does a purchaser of a security
have any obJ-igations?
A. None, other than a contract they may enter
into.
a. On the part of a purchaser of a security, is
there any lega1 obligation in the securities industry for
a purchaser to eng'age in any kind of due diJ-igence or
investigation?
A. No, therets no ob1igation on the part of the
purchaser.
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A. Yes.
a. And what is that?
A. A warrant generalJ-y represents the right to
acquire another security. And so, a warrant ni-ght be the
right at some point irr the future to purchase shares of
stock. And the wamant is a contract that's executed
that g'ives a party the right to purchase shares in this
-- you know, in -- an exannpJ-e I'm using, to purchase
shares of stock at some point in the future.
A. And I'd Like to maybe take a step back and
ask you, in the securities industry, Lf there are
muJ.tiple sellers of a security, do -- what are the
obligations of each of the seJ.lers?
A. Each of the se]-]-ers woul-d have the same
obligations as the other -- the oblig'ations wetve
discussed previously.
MR. PAIUMBO: Your Honor, if I could have a moment?
THE COURT: Yes. Could I ask counsel to approach
one more time?
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as foll-olils) .
THE COITRT: So you guys know this case has been
around and I just read a new case and Judge Davis did not
find any prob1em with a witness - with this witness
generally stating examples, so long as it wasnrt
something that e:pJ.icitly mirrored (inaudibJ.e) used
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occutred in this case. I understand that there was some
comment ahout a concutrence by a judge hearsay from one
of the other judges, but the state of the J-aw doesn't
seem to say that any stating of exampJ-es is is
exclusively precl-uded. I think it's so J.ong as it
doesn't erq>licitly -- I mean, it could mention these
things as an example r 3s J-ong as the witness is is not
saying, weIl, in this case, this conduct would be -- and
that's what paragtaPh two says
MR. PAIUMBO: That is my understanding of the J-aw,
too, Your Honor.
THE COURT: in Moore, right? So, the witness in
Moore gave a definition of material, and then gave a l-ist
of examples. And the opinion was that the list of
examples was g'eneral enough that it was okay -- that an
e:<pert witness can give that opinion, so long as it's not
e:q>licitly tied to, or the words used, explicitly mirrors
the allegation made in this case. You donrt anticipate,
if you were to ask the witness, that he would just list
these things and then talk about how the al.legations in
this case --
MR. PAI"TUMBO: I don't anticipate that, Your Honor'
THE COURT: OkaY.
MS. TAIIGARO: WelI, have you discussed it with him?
MR. PAIUMBO: Yes.
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objection
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TAIIIGARO: Okay
CUMMINGS: One I would stiJ.l like my
Candidly, Moore is one judge.
COURT: Okay.
CUMMINGS: So it's not a majority (inaudible).
sure. And it's the Court ofTHE COURT: Sure'
Appeal-s.
MR. CITMMINGS: It's the Court of Appeals, toor so
theret s
THE COITRT:Supreme Court couLd sti1l say something--
MR. CITMMINGS: It's stil-l- an oPen issue.
THE COITRT : l'tn-hmm.
MR. CUMMINGS: I do think there's issues of ]-aw
here.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. CUMMINGS: Specifica1ly giving exampJ.es' And
it's and again, with this case, different (inaudible)
this case, the issues that vfe're discussing are squarely
within the laymanr s understanding 'of what it is
(inaudible). We're not talking complex issues, werre
tal-king (inaudibJ-e) .
THE COURT: OkaY.
MR. CITMMINGS: So. ' .
THE COURT: Okay. So, I'LL aIlow it, as long as
you're within the parameters of State v. Moore.
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MR. PAIUMBO : Okay.
THE COITRT: Okay?
MR. PALIIMBO: Thank you.
(End of sidebar).
MR. PALUMBO: And, Your Honor, if I could just have
a moment?
fHE COITRT: Yes. Sure
A. (BY l4R. PAIIMBO) Mr. Lloyd, just a few more
questions. Based on your understanding of the securities
industry, a f,ew moments ago we diseussed the issue of
material information. Could you give some exampJ.es, in
the securities industry, what material. information might
include, just generally?
A. Yes. It depends on the individual entity,
but materia1 information would be again information
that's important to an investor making a decision. It
coul-d inc]-ude information al.out the business, the
underlying assets of the business, if those assets are
fixed assets that you can touch and feel r ot are they
technoJ-og-y assets where you have to understand the nature
of the particular technology. It would include
information about the management, who is it that's
running this enterprise, what's their background, whatrs
their experience, have they ever been invol-ved in
criminal- or other inappropriate activity, have they ever
50
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been sanctioned by regulators.
It can involve looking at the financial information
about the enterprise in order to determine whether the
financial assets are sufficient to conduct the
operations, and what the -- what the financial- statements
look Like. It could include risks, what are the risks of
the business, where could this business have probJ.ems in
the future, and what's the t11pe of information that an
investor would want to -- would want to know about
potentia1 risks? Those are a few exampJ-es.
A. Thank you. And a few moments agor You
described various tlpes of securities. Does a security
have to fal-J- into only one category?
A. No, you couJ-d have instruments which satisfy
muJ.tipJ-e categories.
MR. PAIUMBO: Thank You.
And Your tlonor' if I could just have one more
moment?
THE COIJRT: Yes.
MR. PAIUMBO: Thank You, Mr. LJ-oyd. Those are al-l
the questions I
THE COIJRT:
have.
Okay. Cross examination?
MR.
///
///
CUMMINGS: Thank You, Your Honor
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A. So, in your e:q>erience, are there certain
characteristics that you look for? And I -- you may have
tal-ked about some of these, but are there certain
characteristics that you J.ook for in analyzingr a business
or an individual to determine fraud, or theft r ot deceit?
MR. CITMMINGS: Your Honor, may we approach?
THE COIJRT: Yes.
(Whereupon a sidebar was heJ.d as fol-lows) .
MR. CUMMINGS: This is going to be the same, Your
Honor. Same issue as Mr. LJ-oyd. Whether the
characteristics track closely to this case, and
evidence, and thenespecially after he laid out alI the
he asked what characteristics,
the characteristics were as to
he's going to go over what
what the evidence just
said. I think that's highly prejudicial, and also for
the jury.
MR. TAYLOR: Hers griving his opinion as to what
characteristics of financial- fraud are. I mean, that's
as an e:q>ert, her s qual-ified to do that.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. C(MMfNGS: I was going to say, if you go back
to the Moore case, though, what concerned at least one
judge on the Court of Appeals there, was that the
characteristics track too closeJ-y to the case.
THE COURT: Is that the concurrent opinion?
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MR. CI]MMfNGS: DVell, it was the _- it was the
opinion of the court that wasn't joined by the two other
judges.
THE COIIRT: Okay. So --
!dR. CUMMTNGS: So
THE COITRT: yeah.
MR. TAYLOR: And I,m not asking him to talk If m
asking him in general right now.
THE COURT: !tn-hmn.
MR. TAYLOR: And if I recaLl
THE COURT: yeah. The case law says you can ask
general1y, but you canf t tie it specificarly to the case,
rtrs part of why r changed my mind on the objection to
the material omission because it seemed to me that the
case law says that you ca.n't tie it to the caser you
can't say that, pursuant to Utah 1aw, these are the
things
l4R. TAYLOR: Right .
THE couRT: But a witness can testify generally --
an expert witness can testify g'enerarry as to things he
looks for, orr you know, thing,s of that nature, aS 1ong.
as it's not tied to this case. So, if you're going to
ask general-ly what characteristics somebody looks for in
the -- in the industry, and so forth, r think that was
the testimony that the court of Appeals -- and r r:anf t
207
25
05212
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I
9
10
t2
13
L4
15
t6
t7
18
19
20
11
2L
22
23
24
said was okay.
this case, here
MR. CITMMINGS : And that' s
going. Because he said, you
testimony, you've heard aJ-J.
sat
where that question was
through aJ.J. the
we just
what do you
the evidence,
reviewed alJ- the bank records. Generally,
remenber if it's the Davis ca.se r ot .Iudge
But you cannot sdy, based
is what I saw.
GreeJ-ey had
on my review in
in the
that
look for?
THE COURT: t"ftn-hnm.
MR. CIIMMINGS: Itts tied directly to the case.
MR. TAYLOR: I can rephrase that question. I can
s4y, based on your e:q>erience, in your profession in
genera1, what are -- what are characteristics of
financial- fraud?
THE COURT: Okay. !ile1J., you need to make sure that
the witness does not say, I'welJ-, in this case here's what
I saw. rr .
MR.
THE
industry
Looks for
TAYLOR: Yeah.
COURT: He
the things
can testify generalJ-y
that are looked forr o!
in his position, when he's anal.yzing,
somebody
you know,
208
in g'enera1 cases. He can testify about that. But he
canrt sayrrr well , in this case, herets what I saw.rt
MR. CITMMINGS: I woul-d still like to J-odge an
objection that, dt this juncture in the direct25
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examination, there's no way to have this untethered from
the case, after he's laid out all the evid.ence
THE COURT: !ilelI, he can --
l4R. CIIMMINGS: -- gone through al.l the exhibits,
so...
THE COURT: -- he can testify about things that
were red flags to him.
MR. CttMMfNGS: Sure.
THE COURT: That's what he,s testified to
MR. CUMMINGS: Sure. And he -- and he has.
THE COURT: --thus far.
MR. CUMMINGS: But nor,r on a summation saying, what
do you look for in fraud, I !, just at this point, I
wouLd J-ike to lodge the objection.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CUMMINGS: You can, of course, overrule it,
but --
THE COURT: So so, your objection is sustained
as to anything -- if the intent was to get him to go
through this case and say, what's frauduLent in this
case.
MR. TAYLOR: WeII, he can opine as to whether there
are characteristics of financial fraud in this case. r
mean, he's allowed to do that under Rul_e 704. His
testimony -- e:q>ert testimony that embraces the ultimate
209
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THE COIIRT: So, this is the part of the law that I
think is sometimes confusing to lawyers, and I don't
profess to be the person that knows this, but as a
general proposition, a witness -- and I think Moore and
Cha.pman say that an e:lpert witness, in certain
circumstances, can give their opinion about the ultimate
issue in a case. But there are some situations where
they canrt.
And if I'm going to err on the side of not creatingr
an issue for appeal, it wouJ-d be, you get where you want
to go by having the witness testify aLout what
characteristics of fraud that he looks for generally,
rather than having him say, you know, here's what I saw
was fraud in this case.
MR. TAYLOR: [ile1]-, it -- in that case, Your Honor,
what Ir11 do is I'11 ask him, in general-, based on his
practice and his knowJ-edge of --
THE COIIRT: Right.
MR. TAYLOR: -- of forensic accounting --
THE COURT : !h-hmm.
MR. TAYLOR: -- what are some characteristics of
financial. fraud? And then I guess the Court's -- under
the Court's ruling, I'fli -- I'm just -- I'11 have to leave
it at that.
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THE COURT: WeII, and then you can argrre it. you
can arg'ue it to the jury. Right?
what --
But I is there any
case Law that identifies that says a witness
an e:<I)ert witness in this situation can say, well, herers
the frauduJ.ent things that I saw in this case?
MR. TAYLOR: ff I coul_d have a second, your Honor?
THE COITRT: Okay.
(fnaudible conversation) .
MR. TAYLOR: .Tudge, our understanding of case law
is that this is territory we can g'et into, and I would
1993. Now, that was a casecite the Larsen decision from
where a securities e:q>ert testified, and r believe the
utah supreme court held that the securities e:q>ert courd.
oPJ.ne as
omt_ssJ-ons
to whether the -- the aLLeged material
were materia1 -- wouLd be material or important
to the average investor.
And in addition to that, the Chapman caser wG
believe, is actually supportive of us, and if the I
don't mean to ask for a recess, but if the court wanted
to review that, r berieve that therers a part of that
decision --
THE COURT: There is.
MR. TAYLOR: WeLl, I beJ.ieve that there,s a part of
that decision which says that --
THE COURT: yeah, and that's why I say, to talk
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J-etrs give the jury a recess and we can tal-k about this--
MR. TAYLOR: Okay.
THE COURI: -- at length. Okay?
MR. TAYLOR: Okay .
(End of sidebar).
THE COIIRT: Members of the jury, Irte t re going to
Please do not
time to put some
take about a five or lO-minute recess.
talk about the case. We just need the
things on the record.
Raine?
(!{hereupon the jury l-eft the courtroom) .
THE COIIRT: Please be seated. AlL members of the
jury have now left the courtroom.
The discussion regarding the question asked, of Mr.
Curtis is -- at sidebar is on the record, and I asked the
jury to step outside so that we can tal-k about this more
thoroughly rather than on the record. The state has
identified State V. Larsen and State v. Chapman. And let
me read this part of Chapman which, again, is what I had
indicated to the parties at sidebar.
There are certaj.n things that, under State v.
Chapmanr dD expert witness can testify about. And in
fact, State v. Chapman says, quoter dD e:q>ert witness may
testify j-n the form of an opinion, and can opine on an
uJ.timate issue at trial, so long as that testimony is
2L2
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otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.
And then it -- well, and the next -- and then it
cites RuJ-e 7O4. And then it goes on and says, 'an
opinion is not objectionabLe just because it embraces an
ultimate issue. An expert witness exceeds the scope of
permissibJ-e testimony when the witness's 1egal
conclusions blur the separate and distinct
responsibiLities of the judge, iury, and witness r ot
there is a danger that the juror may turn to the
witnessts legal concLusion rather than judge for guidance
on the appJ.icab1e law.'
So, and I'Il_ read the next sentence, because I
think it demonstrates why we are struggling with this
issue.
The case says, ,no bright J.ine separates
permissible urtimate issue testimony under Rule ':.04, and
impermissible overbroad legar responses a witness may
g'ive during questioning, and the triaL court has wide
discretion in determining the admissibirity of e:q>ert
testimony.'
So, as f indicated to counsel at sidebar, there is
no complete exc1usion of an e:q>ert witness from
testifying'or giving an opinion,
an uLtimate issue at tria1. And
or opining on the
says. The but there are cases, there are situations
on
that's what the case Law
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where I think the -- the e:q>ert witness can overstep
their bounds and takes away the determination from the
jury as to the ultimate issue at hand. And if that's the
case r ot when that is the case, the trial court should
not alLow the witness to give their opinion about certain
things. If it appears that that is going to take away
from the jury, ot the finder of fact, their
responsibiJ-ity of making the ultimate determinations in
this case.
Okay. So, the objection has been made by Mr.
Curnmings. Let me hear, Mt. Tay1or, what your position
is, and exactJ-y what question, and what you are seeking
from the witness, and then I'11 hear from Mr. Cummings
and make a ruJ-ing.
MR. TAYLOR: First, the question that I'm a.sking
his e>q>erience, Lf there are certainMr. Curtis is,
characteristics that he looks for in
t-n
or an individuaL to determine fraud,
And I couJ.d rephrase that to make it
anal-yzing a business
deceit r ot theft.
clear that I'm
asking based on his e:<perience, his knowJ.edge, and -- as
a forensic accountant, Lo e:q>J.ain what those
characteristics are. f beJ.ieve he wouLd give off a list
of certain characteristics. For exampJ.e, business
activity is dependant on outside investor money --
investor money not used for its stated purpose, business
2L4
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enteryrise lacks profits sufficient to provid.e the
promised returns to investors, high rates of return
relative to the promoted investment risk, business
e:q>eriences that the business e:q>eriences increasing
insoJ-vency, and preferential treatment to certain
investors, disregard to corporate formarities. Those are
characteristics of financial fraud that he wouLd outline
or list.
And then f wouLd. ask him, after reviewing the
financial- records associated with this case, and,
listening to the testimony at triar -- and perhaps r
shouLd've asked this Later -- but based. on g'enerarly
accepted accounting practices, do you see any of these
characteristics present in this case? And r would ask
him to identify any such characteristics that he -- that
he has observed in this case. And r would ask him if he
had an opinion as to whether the defend.ants engraged in
the course of business which operated as a fraud., deceit,
or theft.
I would ask him, what is your opj-nion? And I
believe that he wourd testify that he d.oes see what
appear to be the characteristics of financiar fraud., and
he would outline which ones he sees.
THE COURT: Okay.
Mr. Cummings.
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MR. CIIMMINGS: f think the witness has al-ready
testified to most of that. Hers used the term red flag
multipJ-e times. Hets said that certain charges are
troubJ-ing. And so, he' s given an e:q)ert opinion as to
what the summaries elicit, what the charges -- what he
beLieves the charges refLect.
And in Moore, I think this is important, as the
Court has said, an erq)ert witness can tie their opinion
cantt tie their opinion to 1aw -- to the law -- to
Utah 1aw, but can embrace an ultimate conclusion, but at
the end of this paragraph 22, the court says, tother
jurisdictions have determined that erq>ert witness
testimony that encompasses an ul-timate issue is general.J-y
admissib]-e when it a].ludes to an inference that the trier
of facts should make, et uses a term that has both a lay
factual meaning and a legaI meaning, and. it's cJ-ear that
the witness is using only the factua1 term.
And in here, the -- itrs the lega1 meaning of
fraud. This is indicia of accounting fraud, this is
indicia of an enterprise running in a frauduJ-ent manner.
f believe that the accounting e:q>ert, Mr. Curtis, has
J.aid out aJ-J- the information, and the jury needs to draw
that final inference of whether it constitutes legal
fraud.
THE COURT: Okay.
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MR. TAYLOR: And --
MR. CUMMINGS: And I would also say it's
prejudicial under 403 considering the seguencing of the
questions and where werre at in questioning.
THE COIIRT: Okay.
MR. TAYLOR: ff I may, your Honor?
THE COIIRT: Sure.
MR. TAYLOR: My recollection of the Moore opinion
is that the witness cannot tie his opinion to the
requirernents of Iaw. In Moorer w€'re taLking about
securities fraud, and, of course, therers a J.ot of gray
area when it comes to what the l_aw is -- Utah J-aw, and
what the securities statutes say.
Herer w€rre not tal.king about the law. Werre
tal-king al.out greneral-J.y accepted accounting principJ-es.
So, there's that distinction.
And al.so, again, f'm not asking him to -- to say,
this is fraud, it's just that these are characteristics
of fraud which r see, and thatts the distinction there.
And finaI1y, the Chapman decision, in Chapman, the
court recoginized that where the expert does not
specifical-ly testify that the defendant was guilty, or
that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the lega1
standard, r beJ.ieve the court upherd the expert testimony
that was rendered in that case, which was from a
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securities expert, I bel-ieve.
THE COIIRT: Okay.
MR. TAYLOR: So, there are those distinctions.
THE COURT: Anything further?
MR. CITMMINGS: I did, and I just totalJ-y lost my
train of thought. HoJ-d on, one mornent.
I don't think my -- I would have an objection if
Mr. Curtis testified that certain accounting practices
here, as evidenced by the banking records, violated GAAP,
or the General-ly Accepted. Accounting Principles. But
it's the -- it's the connection of, do these bank records
show fraud? Are these -- you know, what you have
reviewed here, is this a frauduJ.ent scheme? And to me,
therers an important difference between those two --
between those two 1ines of questioning.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further?
So, I'm going to al-J-ow the testimony to go through
as J.ong as
under the
there is no mention of, under Utah J-aw, or
laws of the State of Utah, ot federaL J.aw, and
has a1ready testified that he -- Iso forth. The witness
mean, there -- Itm assuming -- and I think Ifm correct --
that there are investigations in the industry J-ooking for
fraud, or fraudulent conduct, that may not necessarily
rise to the leveJ- of a criminal- offense, that there --
you know, that they may be different. So, so long: as the
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questioning is tied to the witnessrs e:rperience as a
fraud investigator, his e:q>erience in the industry, what
the industry looks like, what the industry r-ooks for, and
so forth, r the testimony can come in. particurarly
because testimony related to, what are characteristics of
fraud, are not things that are within the kin or the
understanding normally of a J.alperson, it's information
that normalJ-y would come from an e:q>ert, defining what
the industry believes are things that are looked for,
characteristics, and so forth.
Itrs part of the reason that I changed my mind and
aLlowed the testimony reg'arding what the j-ndustry
considers is materiaL information and so forth during the
testimony of Mr. Lloyd. So again, I think so long as the
questioning and the answers do not touch onr you know,
the ultimate question under Utah law, or under the
statutes and so forth, ES to what is fraudulent, what is
securities fraud, and so forth. The witness can testify
about his understanding, what is the accepted standard
and characteristics in the industry, and so forth.
Any clarification needed?
Any objection if -- well, Mr. Curtis is here on the
witness stand, and r think he's heard the court's ruJ.ingr,
but I -- as Irve indicated in the past, if counsel
believe that they are going into an area that might cause
2L9
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an issue, unless therefs an objection, I wouLd be fine if
leading questions are used.
Mr. Cummings?
!dR. CIMMINGS: I wouJ,d just like to put on the
record. that, as with Mr. Lloyd, the initial- round of
questions with Mr. LJ.oyd, I don't beJ.ieve that it's
heJ-pful to the
Court's ruling,
trier of fact. And I understand the
actual-J.y, testified -- he testified general-J-y
sufficientJ.y general, did not say that under
the State of Utah
wefd just 1ike the record cJ.ear that part
of our objection is al-so on that aspect.
THE COURT: Yeah. And I looked at the Chapman
case, I think Chapman and Moore or one or the other,
and the Court of Appeal-s in one or both of those cases
determined that when the witness and I think it was
Mr. L1oyd,
enough r ot
the Laws of this was the case, and my
asked by Mr. Pal-umbo was,recoJ.J.ection of the question
according to the industry r ot in the industry, yada,
yada, yada.
And the case J.aw seemed to me to say that therets
not an absolute prohibition against an e:q>ert testifying
about what a material omission, or what material
information is. It depends on the case. And I think in
this case, the -- the conduct and the things the
subscription agreements, things of that nature, are
220
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things that r donrt think the ordinary citizen, ord.inary
juror, would understand unless they have some special.ized
knowledge. And so, it was necessary for Mr. LJ_oyd, to
give that information during his testimony. Okay.
ShalJ- we bring the jury in? Raine?
while Raine is doing that, J.et me aLso indicate the
following -- in case r forget, wirl one of you remind me?
All the jurors have to reave their copies of the exhibit
here. They cannot take them home. But r donrt want to
forget that. In other words, I don't want somebody
taking it home and Looking at it tonight. They can look
at them here and review them, and then when theyrre d,one,
they leave everything, and they go home, and come back,
and so forth. r think that's the way it should be d.one,
because we don't J-et them take any exhibits home.
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroorn).
THE COURI: A11 members of the jury are now in the
courtroom, al-r counsel are present, and the defendant is
present.
Mr. Taylor?
MR. TAYLOR: Thank you.
THE COITRT: And Mr. Curtis resumes the witness
stand, he I s previousJ.y been sworn in.
a. (BY MR. TAYLOR) Ur. Curtis, a couple more
questions. r cantt remember where we Left off, so Iet me
22t
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ask you t'his. You indicated that you have partj.cuJ_ar
e:q>erience investigating and analyzing records of
companies or individual.s al.J-eged to have engaged in
fraud, deceit r ot theft? Is that correct?
A. Yes. That's right.
a. In your e:<perience, and based on your
practice, are there certain characteristics that you look
for in analyzing a business or an individuaL to determine
fraud, deceitr or theft?
A. Yes.
a. Can you briefly expJ.ain what those
characteristics are in general?
A. Generally, yeah. As it relates to investment
fraud, there woul-d be things like misrepresentations,
financia]. that cou].d be financial statement
misrepresentations, or misrepresentations of how the
moneyrs being used, or faiLure to disclose materiaL
information, or that could be omissions.
So, if the party has knowledge of material
information and does not discJ.ose that to investors,
that's import'ant. Disregard for corporate formalities.
Thatrs where corporations -- business and personal could
be commingled and confused, that could be part of that,
or disregarded in that way. A business being dependent
on investor money. Investor money not being used for the
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stated purpose that's stated to investors, it's used. for
other purposes or unauthorized purposes. Those are
those are some of the main characteristics we look at.
a. Maybe you touched on this, but what about the
business enterprise Lacking profits sufficient to provide
the promised returns to investors?
A. Yes. And alsor you know, sometimes
businesses are insorvent, that means their Liabilities
exceed their assets r ot they become further insorvent as
they continue to operate, or operate with very smal_L
capital r ot undercapitalized.
A. Thank you. After reviewing the financial-
records associated with this case, and after ristening to
the testimony of this triar, based on generarry accepted
accounting practices, do you -- and principles, do you
see any of these characteristics present in this case?
A. Yes.
A. And which ones, in your opinion?
A. Right. I see characteristics of
misrepresentations and omissions, of investor money not
being used for the stated purpose, of inadequate
capitalization or lack of capital to operate the
business. Those are the main ones that come to mind.
And dependence on investor money, obviousJ_y.
A. Are those aII characteristics that you see?
223
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Addendum G
Addendum G

INSTRUCTION No. ;o
FACT VS. EXPERT WITNESS:
There are two types of witnesses: fact witnesses and expert witnesses.
Usually afactwitness can testiff only about facts that he/she can see, hear, touch ,
taste or smell. An expert witness has scientific, technical or other special
knowledge that allows the witness to give an opinion. An expert's knowledge can
come from training, education, experience or skill. An expert can testiff about
facts, and they can give their opinions in their area of expertise.
In weighing the opinion of an expert, you may look at their qualifications, the
reasoning process the expert used, and the overall credibility of their testimony.
You may also look at things like bias, consistency, and reputation.
Use your common sense in evaluating all witnesses including any expert
witness. You do not have to accept an expert's opinion. You may accept it all,
reject it all, or accept part and reject part. Give it whatever weight you think it
deserves.
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TNSTRUCTTON NO.
DAVID BUTTARS is charged in count one of the second Amended
criminal rnformation with committing SECURITIES FRAUD commencing
on or about March 2009. You cannot convict him of this offense
unless, based on the evidence, vou find beyond a reasonable doubt
each of the following elements:
1. Commencing on or about March 2009, in the state of
UtahrDavidButtars,directlyorindirectly;
2. To Rebecca Gerritsen;
3. In connection with the offer or sale of a security;
4. A. Wil1fu]ly made an untrue statement of a material
fact or omitted to state a mataial fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in ]1ght of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misLeading; OR
B. Wiltfully engaged in an act, practice or course of
business which operated or would operate aS a fraud or
deceit upon any Person;
5. At the time, the property, money' or thing unlawfully
obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than
$10, 000 . o0 .
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case,
if you are convinced that each and every element has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt., then you must find the defendant
GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant NOT GUILTY'
3a-
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INSTRUCTION NO . 34
DAVID BUTTARS is charged in count Three of the second
Amended Criminal Information with committing SECURITIES FRAUD
commencing on or about January 2010. You cannot convict him of
this offense unless, based on the evidence, You find beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1. Commencing on or about January 201-0, in the state of
UtahrDavidButtarsrdirectlyorindirectly;
2. To Orjan Gustafssoni
3. In connection with the offer or sale of a security;
4. A. Witlfully made an untrue statement of a material-
fact or omj-tted to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading; OR
B. Wi]lfully engaged in an act, practice or course of
business which operated or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any Person;
5. At the time, the property, money, or thing unlawfully
obta1ned or sought to be obtai-ned was worth l-ess than
$10,000.00.
After you careful-l-y consider alI the evidence in this case,
if you are convinced that each and every element has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant NOT GUILTY.
01405
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3LINSTRUCTION NO.
DAVID BUTTARS is charged in count Five of the second Amended
Criminal Information with committing SECURITIES FRAUD commencing
on or about May 2OOg. You cannot convict him of this offense
unless, based on the evj-dence, You find beyond a reasonable doubt
each of the following elements:
1. Commencing on or about May 2009, in the state of utah,
David Buttars, directly or indirectly;
2. To Janet Hi-nman;
3. In connection with the offer or sale of a security;
4. A. Willfully made an untrue statement of a material-
fact or omitted to state a materlal fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they Were made, not
misleading; OR
B. willfully engaged in an act, practice or course of
business which operated or woul-d operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any Person.
5. At. the time, the property' money' or thing unlawfully
obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than
$10,000.00-
After you carefully consider aII the evidence in this case,
if you are convinced that each and every element has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant NOT GUILTY'
01407

INSTRUCTION NO . 38
DAVID BUTTARS is charged in Count Seven of the Second
Amended Criminal Information with committing SECURITIES FRAUD
commencing on or about summer 2009. You cannot convict him of
this offense unless, based on the evidencer You find beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1. Commencj-ng on or about summer 2009, in the state of
Utah, David Buttars, directly or indirectly;
2. To GarY A. Miller;
3. In connection with the offer or sale of a security;
4. A. Wiltfutly made an untrue statement of a material
fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading; OR
B. Willfutly engaged in an act, practice or course of
business which operated or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any Person;
5. At the time, the property, money, or thing unlawfully
obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $1-0,000.00
or more.
After you carefully consider all the evj-dence in this case'
if you are convinced that each and every element has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convj-nced that each
and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant NOT GUILTY.
01409
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rNsrRucrroN No . 4t
The state of utah must prove that the defendant, DAVID
BUTTARS, acted wi11ful}y in committing the offenses set forth in
Counts L, 3, 5 and 7.
A defendant acts willfully if it was his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result--not that
it was the defendant's conscious desire or objective to violate
the law, nor that the defendant knew that he was committing fraud
in the sa.Ie of the securitY.
01412

}r{r,.{,.n N' -!3-
WILLFULLY
To act willfully it must be a person's conscious objective or desire to engage in certain
conduct or cause a certain result. A person acts willfully if he acts purposefully and not because
of mistake or accident. In the context of willful misstatements or omissions of material faots,
willfully implies knowledge of the falsity of the misstatements and knowledge of the omitted
facts and knowledge of the materiality of the misstatement(s). That knowledge can be infened if
the defendant consciously avoided the existence ofa fact or facts; however, the defendant cannot
be convicted if he was merely negligent, careless or foolish. He must have acted with a
conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts.
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TNSTRUCTION NO. '15
You are instructed that under the l-aws of the State of U.tah,
the following words have the following meanings:
1. "SeIl" or "sale" includes every contract for sale of,
contract to seII r oY dispositi-on of, a security or interest in a
security for value.
2. "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every attempt or
offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a
security or interest in a security for value.
3. A "Materj-al fact" is something which a buyer of
ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of
importance in determining whether to buy a security.
4. "Buy" or 'tpurchase" means every contract for purchase
of, contract to buy, or acquisltion of a security or interest in
a security for value.
5. "Agent" is any individual who represents an issuer in
causing or attempting to cause purchases or sales of securities.
"Agent" does not include an individual who represents an issuer
but who receives no commission or other remuneration, directly or
indirectly, for causj-ng or attempting to cause purchases or sales
of securities in this state, and who causes transactions in
exempt securities.
6. "Issuer" iS any person or entity who issues or proposes
to issue any security or has outstanding a security that it has
issued.
7. "Fraud" is defined as any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; oIr
engage in any act, practicer or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
01416
8. "Security" includes any note, stock, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, investment contract, certifj-cate of
interest or participation i-n an oil, 9ds, or mining title or
l-ease or in payments out of production under such a titte or
leasei and any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security, " or any certificat,e of interest or participation in,
temporary or interj-m certlficate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the
foregolng, or, in general, dDy interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security. "
9. You are instructed that "course of business" means to
engage in business activity.
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INSTRUCTION NO . 4L
One of the allegations against defendant, DAVID BUTTARS, in
each of the charges addressed in Counts I,3,5 and 7, is that
he, dlrectly or indirectly, made an untrue statement of a
material fact, oT omitted to state a material- fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made' not misleading.
Under this allegation, it is not necessary for the State to
prove that the individual investors believed the statements to be
true, nor that they relied upon the statements in their decision
making processr So long as the statements made were such that a
reasonable person in simil-ar circumstances woul-d have reLied upon
the statement.s in making an investment decision'
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INSTRUCTION NO 4'
you are instructed that opini.ons concerning what will happen
in the future are not statements of fact. Even if the
Defendant (s) had an honest belief that an event would occur in
the future or made a good faith effort to bring about the future
event, he is still not permitted to make a wilLful
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact.
Therefore, to the extent that there exists any such belief
that the plan will succeed, that belief does not constitute a
defense to the crimes alleged in this case if you find that the
Defendant has engaged in witlful material misstatements or
omissions.
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rNsrRUCTroN No. Ez
You are instructed that the following words have the following meanings:
Count 9, Pattem of Unlawful Activity, includes the terms "intentionally", "knowingly"
and "willfully". Each of these terms has a specific definition under the law, as follows:
A person engages in conduct "Intentionally" or with intent or willfully with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person engages in conduct "Knowingly" or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result.
The definition for willfully is contained in Instructions No. al I and
4z
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